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Independent Yet Captured: Compensation 
Committee Independence After Dodd-Frank 
Bernice Grant* 
In response to the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 includes several far-reaching executive 
compensation reforms. Because most scholars have focused on the so-called “say-on-
pay” provision, they have not sufficiently analyzed another Dodd-Frank reform that 
requires public companies to have compensation committees composed entirely of 
independent directors. This Article fills that void. Although it is sensible to make 
compensation committee members independent of management, the reform does not go 
far enough to achieve its goal. The independence requirement is not sufficient to prevent 
directors from being captured by management because it does not take into account 
organizational behavior literature regarding group dynamics. Ostensibly independent 
directors might still be subject to organizational behavior factors—such as norms of 
reciprocity, groupthink, polarization, social cascades, and herding—that could lead them 
to approve excessive compensation packages. 
 
This Article thus proposes two additional reforms to augment the independence of 
compensation committee members: (1) mandatory continuing professional education 
regarding compensation issues and (2) a rotation system for compensation committee 
membership. Directors will be less susceptible to the organizational behavior factors 
noted above if they are equipped with knowledge about complex compensation issues 
and tasked with approving compensation for only a limited period of time. These 
recommendations draw on similar requirements under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
which mandate that (1) all members of the audit committee be financially literate, (2) at 
least one audit committee member have financial expertise, and (3) the lead and 
concurring partners of a company’s auditing firm rotate off the client engagement after 
five years.  
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Introduction 
Millions of Americans lost their jobs, their homes, and, moreover, 
their belief in the American dream during the financial crisis of 2008 to 
2009. This despair was exacerbated by reports that executives of 
prominent financial institutions were receiving high amounts of 
compensation, even as the companies they led were failing and, in some 
cases, being bailed out by the federal government using taxpayer dollars. 
Many critics voiced concern that the magnitude and design of executive 
compensation at financial institutions and other large companies played 
a critical role in causing the financial crisis.1 Eventually, public outrage 
over executive compensation reached a boiling point, which led Congress 
to consider reforms to improve executive compensation specifically, and 
corporate governance more generally.2 
In response to such concerns, when Congress enacted the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) 
in July of 2010, it included several far-reaching executive compensation 
reforms.3 Indeed, one author stated that “[t]aken together, the provisions 
in Dodd-Frank that affect the executive pay process quite arguably will 
have the broadest and most significant impact on the pay process of any 
set of new rules ever contained in one law.”4 
The most prominent executive compensation reform is the so-called 
“say-on-pay” provision, which gives shareholders of U.S. public companies 
a nonbinding, advisory vote on executive compensation.5 While scholars 
have extensively analyzed that provision,6 they have not sufficiently 
analyzed another important executive compensation provision: the 
requirement that U.S. public companies have a compensation committee 
composed entirely of independent directors. This Article ventures into 
 
 1. See, e.g., Jay Lorsch & Rakesh Khurana, The Pay Problem, Harv. Mag., May–June 2010, at 30. 
 2. See, e.g., Compensation in the Financial Industry: Hearing Before the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 
U.S. H.R., 111th Cong., Serial No. 111-98 (2010).  
 3. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376, §§ 951–54 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). 
 4. See Joseph E. Bachelder III, Dodd-Frank Provisions Affecting Executive Pay, Harv. L. Sch. 
F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Oct. 5, 2010, 9:05 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/ 
2010/10/05/dodd-frank-provisions-affecting-executive-pay; see also Aon Hewitt, Conference 
Committee Issues Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Executive 
Compensation Alert, June 29, 2010, at 1 (2010), available at http://www.aon.com/attachments/ 
thought-leadership/executive_compensation_alerts/ ECA_2010_03v2.pdf (“Of the over 2,000 pages, 
less than 25 pages apply to executive compensation and corporate governance. However, those few 
pages have a major effect.”). 
 5. Dodd-Frank Act § 951(a). 
 6. See, e.g., Minor Myers, The Perils of Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 36 Del. 
J. Corp. L. 417 (2011); Randall S. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will it Lead to a Greater 
Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1213, 1226 (2012). 
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this void by critiquing that reform and proposing additional reforms for 
increased efficacy.7 
The compensation committee of a company’s board of directors 
approves the compensation of the company’s top executives. The 
compensation committee independence requirement is intended to 
diminish conflicts of interest that can occur when the compensation 
committee is “captured” and thus lacks the independence and objectivity 
that is necessary to determine executive compensation in an arm’s length 
fashion. The term “captured board” refers to a board that is serving the 
interests of management rather than shareholders.8 
While it is sensible to increase the compensation committee’s 
independence from management, the reform does not go far enough 
because it fails to take into account relevant insights from organizational 
behavior literature regarding group dynamics. Directors who are 
nominally independent from management might still be subject to 
organizational behavior factors such as norms of reciprocity, groupthink, 
polarization, social cascades, and herding, which can lead them to approve 
excessive executive compensation packages. 
To counteract this issue, this Article proposes two reforms: 
(1) continuing professional education regarding compensation issues for 
compensation committee members and (2) implementing a rotation 
system for compensation committee members, or at least the chairperson. 
The first reform—continuing education—should be mandatory, but the 
second reform—rotation system—should be recommended for companies 
that have a sufficient number of independent directors on their boards.9 
The rationale for this proposal is that directors will be less susceptible 
to the organizational behavior factors described above if they are 
knowledgeable about compensation issues and are tasked with approving 
compensation for only a limited period of time. These recommendations 
draw on similar features of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-
Oxley”) that require (1) financial literacy of all members of the audit 
committee, (2) financial expertise of at least one audit committee 
member, and (3) the lead engagement partner and concurring partner of 
a company’s independent auditors to rotate off the engagement after a 
fixed period of time.10 
This Article contributes to the existing scholarly literature by 
developing and modernizing reforms that practitioners considered in 
connection with Sarbanes-Oxley, grounding the reforms in organizational 
 
 7. Some scholars have analyzed the compensation committee independence requirement, but in 
general, the articles are primarily descriptive rather than prescriptive. See discussion infra Parts II–III. 
 8. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Governance 65 (2008). 
 9. See discussion infra Subpart III.C.2.b. 
 10. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
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behavior theory to provide a scholarly framework, and applying these 
adaptations to the compensation committee requirements of Dodd-
Frank. From a broader standpoint, this Article highlights some of the 
ways in which organizational behavior theory affects the actions of 
corporate boards, executives, and shareholders. It also illustrates why 
regulatory reform in the corporate governance field must take such 
organizational behavior factors into account. The Article focuses on 
executive compensation, which many scholars regard as the primary issue 
in corporate governance.11 However, the organizational behavior issues 
described herein have broader implications for other aspects of corporate 
governance, such as corporate social responsibility. 
Part I of this Article describes the scholarly debate concerning 
executive compensation and the resulting Dodd-Frank reforms. Part II 
explores organizational behavior literature regarding group dynamics of 
boards and discusses insights from that literature that affect the 
compensation-setting process. Finally, Part III critiques the compensation 
committee independence requirement, proposes two additional reforms 
that draw on the insights from Part II, and provides a comparative law 
perspective. 
I.  Executive Compensation Reforms in Dodd-Frank 
As noted above, this Part describes the background that led to the 
executive compensation reforms in Dodd-Frank and provides further 
detail regarding such reforms. 
A. Scholarly Debate Concerning Executive Compensation 
In response to the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009, President Obama 
signed Dodd-Frank into law on July 21, 2010. Dodd-Frank aimed to 
“promote the financial stability of the United States by improving 
accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to 
fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect 
consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other 
purposes.”12 Dodd-Frank also reformed executive compensation and 
corporate governance, responding to the perception that these issues 
played a role in causing the financial crisis. 
As a threshold matter, there is room for debate as to whether the 
magnitude and/or the design of executive compensation played a role in 
the financial crisis and, as a corollary, whether further regulation of 
 
 11. Daniel J. Morrissey, Executive Compensation and Income Inequality, 4 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. 
Rev. 1, 3 (2013) (quoting NECA-IBEW Pension Fund ex rel. Cincinnati Bell, Inc. v. Cox, No. 1:11-
0451, 2011 WL 4383368, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2011)). 
 12. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376, pmbl (2010). 
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executive compensation was needed. There is significant disagreement 
among scholars over whether executive compensation is, in fact, excessive 
and/or inappropriately designed. While this Article does not seek to 
resolve such debate, it summarizes some of the arguments and provides 
compensation data for the period up to the financial crisis in 2008 to 
provide the necessary background for evaluating the resulting reforms. 
1. Compensation Amount 
The debate over executive compensation concerns both the amount 
of compensation and the design of compensation. Various critics have 
argued that the amount of executive compensation has risen to excessive 
levels, and that this played a role in the financial crisis. For example, Paul 
Volcker, the former chair of the Federal Reserve, blamed “excessive pay 
packages” for the failing financial markets in 2008.13 As it is difficult to 
prove empirically that executive compensation is “excessive,” the 
literature in support of this claim usually relies on indirect evidence. Some 
scholars argue, for example, that the dramatic rise in CEO pay in 
comparison to the average worker’s pay is evidence of income inequality.14 
These scholars also devised a formula indicating that pay is excessive to 
the extent that it exceeds the amount of pay attributable to a CEO’s 
ability, effort, and a risk premium.15 
Indeed, the gap between the pay of CEOs and that of other 
employees has expanded dramatically. For example, in 1980 the ratio of 
average CEO pay to average employee pay was 44:1, but by 2007 it had 
risen to 344:1.16 A more recent study of the 300 largest companies in 
America revealed that this ratio remained steady at 343:1 in 2010.17 
Accordingly, one of Dodd-Frank’s reforms requires U.S. public 
companies to disclose internal pay equity—the ratio between CEO and 
employee pay.18 Nonetheless, the ratio of CEO pay to average employee 
 
 13. Kathryn J. Kennedy, Excessive Executive Compensation: Prior Federal Attempts to Curb 
Perceived Abuses, 10 Hous. Bus. & Tax L.J. 196, 208 (2010). 
 14. See, e.g., John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Is There a Case for Regulating Executive Pay in the 
Financial Services Industry?, in After the Crash 115 (Yasuyuki Fuchita et al. eds., 2010). 
 15. John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Is CEO Pay Too High and Are Incentives Too Low? A 
Wealth-Based Contracting Framework, 24 Acad. Mgmt. Persp. 5, 15 (2010) (providing the formula: 
“Pay = CEO ability + cost of effort + incentive risk premium + excess pay”). 
 16. See Lorsch & Khurana, supra note 1, at 30, 31; see also Morrissey, supra note 11, at 13 (“In 
1965, the typical American CEO made 24 times the average worker. By 2007, that differential had 
increased by more than tenfold to 275, and it has continued to grow.”). Results of various studies differ 
somewhat due to the composition of companies that were included in the sample and how 
compensation was determined. 
 17. See Morrissey, supra note 11, at 13 (noting that the ratio of pay for the CEOs of the 
300 largest companies in America compared to the average worker was 343:1 in 2010). 
 18. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376, § 953 (2010). But see Steven M. Davidoff, A Simple Solution that Made a Hard Problem 
More Difficult, N.Y. Times DealBook (Aug. 27, 2013, 4:53 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/ 
Grant_21 (B. Buchwalter) (Do Not Delete) 4/9/2014 4:37 PM 
April 2014]    INDEPENDENT YET CAPTURED 767 
pay at large companies grew to 354:1 in 2012.19 This suggests that further 
reform might be needed, though the internal pay equity disclosure 
requirement has not yet been finalized or implemented by regulators.20 
Further, data indicates that the compensation level of executives of 
U.S. public companies has, indeed, risen dramatically. For example, in 
1990 the average total compensation for CEOs was approximately 
$2.6 million, but by 2008—when the financial crisis hit—it had risen to 
approximately $14.1 million.21 The persistence of large amounts of 
executive compensation, particularly in the absence of correspondingly 
high levels of corporate financial performance, led to calls for executive 
compensation reform. Moreover, a recent study for the period from 
1993 to 2012 revealed that “[a]bout 40 percent of the highest-paid CEOs 
in the United States over the past 20 years eventually ended up being 
fired, paying fraud-related fines or settlements, or accepting government 
bailout money.”22 
Interestingly, many members of corporate boards also believe that 
executive pay is excessive, even though they determine such pay. For 
example, a majority of directors who attended the National Association 
of Corporate Directors conference in October 2008 agreed that CEO pay 
was too high.23 In addition, a, August 2009 survey of 140 directors of U.S. 
public companies found that fifty-nine percent believed that there should 
be decreases in executive benefits and perquisites, fifty-two percent felt 
that retirement packages should be reduced, and seventy-three percent felt 
that severance pay should be reduced.24 Part II of the Article discusses why 
some directors approve compensation that they believe is excessive. 
 
08/27/a-simple-solution-that-made-a-hard-problem-more-difficult/?_r=1 (noting that problems in 
calculating various types of compensation make it difficult to compare compensation amounts, 
especially for multinational conglomerates with employees in different countries). 
 19. Nadia Damouni, Highest-Paid U.S. CEOs Are Often Fired or Fined: Study, Reuters (Aug. 28, 
2013, 2:12 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/28/us-companies-pay-idUSBRE97R10C20130828 
(describing a 2013 report by the Institute for Policy Studies). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Forbes, Two Decades of CEO Pay, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2012/12/ceo-compensation-12-
historical-pay-chart.html. 
 22. Id.; see Sarah Anderson et al., Inst. Pol’y Stud., Executive Excess 2013: Bailed Out, 
Booted, Busted 1 (2013) (examining the 241 CEOs who were the twenty-five highest paid CEOs in 
America in one or more of the past twenty years). 
 23. NACD Directorship, Directors Agree: CEO Pay Too High, Directorship (Oct. 23, 2008), 
abstract available at http://governancefocus.blogspot.com/2008/10/directors-agree-ceo-pay-too-
high.html. 
 24. Jena McGregor, Even Most Directors Think CEO Pay is Too High, Bloomberg 
Businessweek (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/careers/managementiq/archives/ 
2009/09/even_most_directors_think_ceo_pay_is_too_high.html (describing a survey conducted by the 
University of Southern California Marshall School of Business). However, forty-nine percent of the 
directors surveyed did not support the imposition of say-on-pay and seventy-one percent did not 
support the imposition of caps on the amount of pay. Id. 
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Of course, many everyday Americans are outraged by the disparity 
between the income of the wealthiest one percent and the rest of the 
population.25 Politicians were sensitive to that public sentiment, which 
was later catalyzed by the related Occupy Wall Street movement. For 
example, President Obama called the $18.4 billion in bonuses that Wall 
Street financial executives received in the midst of the 2008 financial 
crisis “shameful.”26 Moreover, a recent economic study reveals that the 
largest group of the highest-income earners are executives and other 
managers in companies, in finance as well as in other industries.27 This 
supports the notion that high levels of compensation have fueled income 
disparities.28 
In contrast, some finance scholars argue that pay levels are efficient. 
One scholar suggests that “despite some notable outliers, executive 
compensation on the whole correlates to results.”29 Scholars also argue 
that although many features of pay packages might appear inconsistent 
with standard optimal contracting theory,30 “optimal contracting theories 
can explain the recent rapid rise in pay, the low level of incentives and 
their negative scaling with firm size, pay-for-luck, the widespread use of 
options (as opposed to stock), severance pay and debt compensation, and 
the insensitivity of incentives to risk.”31 Other scholars note “that the 
sharp growth in executive compensation after the 1970s is accompanied 
by a similar growth in the stock market value of the firms.”32 Since 
executives have increasingly been compensated in stock rather than cash 
during that period, they have benefited from the increase in the value of 
their companies’ stock.33 
 
 25. See, e.g., Tami Luhby, Who Are the 1 Percent?, CNNMoney (Oct. 29, 2011, 8:40 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/20/news/economy/occupy_wall_street_income/index.htm (noting that in 
2009, the top one percent of American taxpayers made a minimum of $343,927 but an average of 
$960,000; they accounted for seventeen percent of the nation’s income). 
 26. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Stephen Labaton, Obama Calls Wall Street Bonuses ‘Shameful’, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 30, 2009, at A1. 
 27. Morrissey, supra note 11, at 6 (citing Peter Whoriskey, With Executive Pay, Rich Pull Away 
from Rest of America, Wash. Post (June 18, 2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-06-
18/business/35234600_1_income-gap-personal-income-capital-gains (describing a landmark analysis of 
tax returns that revealed that forty-one percent of the top 0.1 percent of earners are executives, 
managers, and supervisors at non-financial companies, and eighteen percent are in finance). 
 28. Id. at 5–6. 
 29. Knowledge @ Wharton, Outrage over Outsized Executive Compensation: Who Should Fix It 
and How?, Wharton Sch. Univ. Penn. (Feb. 4, 2009), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
Article.cfm?Articleid=2151. 
 30. See discussion infra Subpart II.A. 
 31. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, Is CEO Pay Really Inefficient? A Survey of New Optional 
Contracting Theories, 15 Eur. Fin. Mgmt. 486, 486 (2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1265067. 
 32. Core & Guay, supra note 14, at 118. 
 33. This is due in part to Congress’ enactment of section 162(m) of the Federal Tax Code in 1993, 
which places a $1 million cap on the amount of compensation that public companies can deduct for 
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2. Compensation Design 
Whereas the above criticisms address the amount of compensation, 
other criticisms address the design or structure of compensation. Various 
scholars have conducted studies indicating that the incentives created by 
the design of executive compensation caused excessive risk taking by 
banks, which led to the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009.34 Moreover, the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (the “FCIC”), which was appointed 
by Congress to explore the financial crisis, reached a similar conclusion.35 
The FCIC found that compensation design played a role in inducing 
financial institutions to take reckless risks, which ultimately contributed 
to the firms’ failure.36 Compensation at financial institutions such as 
Merrill Lynch, AIG, Citigroup, Bear Sterns, and Lehman Brothers 
disproportionately rewarded short-term risk taking because it was often 
designed to reward short-term gain (e.g., return on equity) without 
proper consideration of long-term consequences.37 For example, many 
mortgage brokers were paid based on the volume of loans originated 
rather than the long-term quality or performance of the loans.38 
Other studies, however, find little relation between the financial 
crisis and executive compensation design. For example, one empirical 
study revealed that “a greater proportion of incentive pay does not 
increase the likelihood for a bank to be a problem or failed institution.”39 
Other scholars note that many boards and executives did not understand 
the risk that they were taking, so a different pay structure might have led 
to the same outcome.40 Another study found that “[t]here is no evidence 
that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the 
 
certain executives but exempts performance-based compensation such as equity compensation. I.R.C. 
§ 162(m) (2012). 
 34. See, e.g., Letter from Sanjai Bhagat et al., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n (Apr. 25, 2011), at 5, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-13.pdf; see 
also Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Bank Executive Compensation and Capital Requirements Reform 1 
(Working Paper, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1781318 
(studying the fourteen largest financial institutions from 2000 to 2008). 
 35. Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report 61–64 (2011). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 64. 
 39. Lin Guo et al., Bank Executive Compensation Structure, Risk Taking, and the Financial 
Crisis 6–7 (Oct. 10, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1664191. 
However, this study also noted that “[o]verall, the existing literature indicates that the empirical 
findings on the relation among executive compensation, risk taking, valuation and performance in the 
banking industry vary with the data and sample selection, regulatory environment, methodologies 
used and compensation measurements.” Id. at 10. 
 40. See, e.g., David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Executive Compensation—Did High Pay Cause the 
Financial Crisis?, Stan. U. Corp. Governance & Leadership Wire (Feb. 22, 2010, 6:00 PM), 
http://www.stanford.edu/group/gsb_corpgov/cgi-bin/blog/?p=1395. 
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interests of their shareholders performed better during the crisis and 
some evidence that these banks actually performed worse.”41 
In sum, although there is certainly room for disagreement over 
whether executive compensation contributed to the financial crisis, some 
evidence (particularly the FCIC study) indicates that it did. With that as 
background, this Article now examines the executive compensation and 
corporate governance reforms that Dodd-Frank implemented to address 
such concerns. Subpart I.B examines the compensation committee 
independence requirement, and Subpart I.C briefly summarizes the other 
reforms. 
B. Compensation Committee Independence Requirement 
Dodd-Frank states that the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
“SEC”) will require all U.S. public companies to have a compensation 
committee comprised of directors who are independent, as determined 
under standards to be promulgated by the national securities exchanges 
and associations (such as the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and 
NASDAQ).42 Companies that do not comply with the rules will be 
delisted after being given a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect.43 
However, even before Dodd-Frank, the NYSE already required 
compensation committees to be composed entirely of independent 
directors,44 and NASDAQ had a similar requirement subject to very 
limited exceptions.45 Dodd-Frank essentially codified the preexisting 
listing requirements but imposed mandatory consideration of two factors 
that impact independence. 
The preexisting independence rule had two parts: (1) a general, 
catch-all rule that prohibits independent directors from having material 
relationships with the company and (2) bright-line tests that prohibit 
 
 41. See Mark A. Calabria, Did Bank CEO Compensation Cause the Financial Crisis?, Cato Inst. 
(Aug. 18, 2009, 5:34 PM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/did-bank-ceo-compensation-cause-the-
financial-crisis (quoting Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit 
Crisis abstract (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15212, 2009)). 
 42. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376, § 952(a) (2010). 
 43. Id. § 952(f). 
 44. N.Y. Stock Exch., Listed Company Manual §§ 303A.02, 303A.05 (2013), available at 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5F1%5F4%5F3&ma
nual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F. 
 45. Under NASDAQ rules, one director who is not independent may be appointed to the 
compensation committee if, under “exceptional and limited circumstances,” such membership is in the 
best interests of the company; however, such a member may not serve more than two years. 
NASDAQ, Stock Market Rules § 5605(c)(2)(B) (2013), available at http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/ 
NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp_1_1_4_3&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2
Fnasdaq-equityrules%2F. Another exception applies to “controlled companies”—companies in which 
fifty percent or more of the stock is held by one individual, group, or company. Id. § 5615(c). For 
simplicity, this Article will focus on NYSE rather than NASDAQ rules. 
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(a) employment of the director or her immediate family members by the 
company, its auditor, or certain other related parties and (b) the 
director’s receipt of more than $120,000 annually for fees from the 
company other than director fees or deferred compensation.46 Boards 
were instructed to broadly consider all relevant facts and circumstances 
in determining material relationships, which “can include commercial, 
industrial, banking, consulting, legal, accounting, charitable, and familial 
relationships, among others.”47 
Effective July 1, 2013, the SEC approved new listing standards to 
implement Dodd-Frank’s requirement, adding to the preexisting rule.48 
Under the new rule, when assessing whether compensation committee 
members have any material relationships that would preclude the 
directors’ independence, boards must now consider whether those 
directors (1) received any consulting, advisory, or other fees beyond 
director fees (the “Fees Factor”), or (2) have any affiliate relationships 
with the company (the “Affiliate Factor”).49 These requirements apply to 
companies listed on either the NYSE50 or NASDAQ.51 To place this 
compensation committee independence requirement in context, this 
Article now briefly describes the other executive compensation reforms 
 
 46. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, § 303A.02. 
 47. Id. § 303A.02(a)(i)(B) cmts. 
 48. See, e.g., Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-68639; 2013 WL 
166322, at 18 (Jan. 11, 2013) (noting that the listing standards commence July 1, 2013, but, due to a 
transition rule, “listed companies would have until the earlier of their first annual meeting after 
January 15, 2014, or October 31, 2014, to comply with the new standards for compensation committee 
director independence”). 
 49. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, § 303A.02. 
 50. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, §§ 303A.05(a), 303A.02(a)(ii); id. § 303A.02(a)(ii) cmts 
(“When considering the sources of a director’s compensation in determining his independence for 
purposes of compensation committee service, the board should consider whether the director receives 
compensation from any person or entity that would impair his ability to make independent judgments 
about the listed company’s executive compensation. Similarly, when considering any affiliate 
relationship a director has with the company, a subsidiary of the company, or an affiliate of a 
subsidiary of the company, in determining his independence for purposes of compensation committee 
service, the board should consider whether the affiliate relationship places the director under the 
direct or indirect control of the listed company or its senior management, or creates a direct 
relationship between the director and members of senior management, in each case of a nature that 
would impair his ability to make independent judgments about the listed company’s executive 
compensation.”). 
 51. NASDAQ Listed Company Manual § 5605. The fees factor was initially stricter for 
NASDAQ-listed companies (they had a bright line prohibition on compensation committee members 
receiving any compensatory payments other than directors’ fees, whereas such fees were only a factor 
that went into the overall independence analysis for NYSE-listed companies) but NASDAQ eventually 
amended its rule to conform to the more lenient NYSE rule. David A. Sirignano & Albert Lung, 
NASDAQ Amends Compensation Committee Independence Rules, Morgan Lewis (Jan. 16, 2014), 
https://www.morganlewis.com/index.cfm/publicationID/c83e5ed6-d867-4dbc-9d64-13add1a130d6/ 
fuseaction/publication.detail (citing the amended rule, SR-NASDAQ-2013-147, available at 
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQ/pdf/nasdaq-filings/2013/SR-NASDAQ-2013-147.pdf).  
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in Dodd-Frank before exploring the organizational behavior issues that 
impact independence. 
C. Other Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance 
Reforms 
In addition to the compensation committee independence 
requirement described above, Dodd-Frank imposes several other 
executive compensation and corporate governance reforms on U.S. public 
companies.52 Because the independence requirement cannot be properly 
analyzed without considering these accompanying reforms, this Subpart 
briefly describes them. As a whole, the package of reforms is intended to 
increase the independence, accountability, and transparency of the pay-
setting process by creating an environment in which: (1) independent 
directors approve executive compensation with the advice of impartial 
compensation consultants; (2) directors are held accountable to 
shareholders for those decisions due to shareholders’ say-on-pay votes; 
(3) executives are held accountable to shareholders by being subject to 
clawbacks if the company’s financial reporting is noncompliant; and (4) the 
relationships between pay and performance, and between CEO pay and 
worker pay become more transparent due to required public disclosure. 
Dodd-Frank includes six specific reforms to achieve these goals. 
Say-on-Pay. All public companies must provide shareholders with a 
so-called “say-on-pay” vote to approve the compensation of its named 
executive officers at least once every three years.53 However, this 
shareholder vote is only an advisory, nonbinding vote on compensation 
that companies have already awarded to executives, and it “may not be 
construed—(1) as overruling a decision by such issuer or board of 
directors; [or] (2) to create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of 
such issuer or board of directors.”54 
 
 52. Exceptions may apply to some U.S. public companies, such as foreign issuers. See Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 952(a) 
(2010). 
 53. Id. § 951(a)(1); see also, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(3)(i)–(iv) (2013) (defining “named executive 
officers” of a company to include (1) the principal executive officer, (2) the principal financial officer, 
(3) “the three most highly compensated executive officers other than [the principal executive officer and 
the principal financial officer],” and (4) up to two other executive officers who would have been included 
as named executive officers if their employment had not terminated before the end of the year). 
 54. Dodd-Frank Act § 951(c). In addition, at least once every six years, shareholders will 
determine whether the say-on-pay vote will occur every one, two, or three years. Id. § 951(a)(2). Say-
on-pay was the key executive compensation reform in Dodd-Frank, and it has been discussed 
extensively in the academic literature. See, e.g., Thomas et al., supra note 6. The adoption of say-on-
pay in the United States followed the adoption of say-on-pay for shareholders of financial institutions 
that received funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program, and the earlier adoption of say-on-pay in 
other countries (such as the United Kingdom in 2003, the Netherlands in 2004, Australia in 2005, 
Sweden in 2006, and Norway and Denmark in 2007). See Jeremy Ryan Delman, Note, Structuring Say-
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Say on Golden Parachutes. Shareholders of public companies can 
also vote on “golden parachutes” (such as deal bonuses or accelerated 
vesting of stock options) provided to named executive officers in 
connection with a change in control of the company, if not already 
included in the general say-on-pay vote.55 
Pay Versus Performance Disclosure. Each public company must 
disclose in its annual proxy statement the relationship between executive 
compensation actually paid and the financial performance of the 
company, taking into account any change in the value of the shares of 
stock and dividends of the company, and any distributions.56 
Internal Pay Equity Disclosure. Each public company must also 
disclose: (1) the median annual total compensation of all its employees 
other than the CEO, (2) the annual total compensation of the CEO, and 
(3) the ratio of the amount in clause (1) to clause (2).57 
Clawbacks. If a public company is required to prepare an accounting 
restatement due to material noncompliance with any financial reporting 
requirement, then the company will recover any excess amounts of 
incentive-based compensation received by any current or former 
executive officer during the three years before the restatement.58 
Compensation Consultants. Compensation committees may only 
select a compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other advisor after 
taking into account factors identified by the SEC that affect the 
independence of such advisors.59 Interestingly, personal relationships 
must be explicitly included in the independence determination for 
consultants, but need not be included in the independence determination 
for compensation committee members.60 
Before analyzing the adequacy of these reforms, this Article 
explores insights that organizational behavior theory provides about the 
pay-setting process. 
 
on-Pay: A Comparative Look at Global Variations in Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 
2010 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 583, 591–97. 
 55. Dodd-Frank Act § 951(b). See generally Kyoko Takahashi Lin, Bernice Grant, Ron Aizen & 
Jamila Diggs, Will Mandatory Shareholder Approval of Golden Parachutes Dull Their Luster?, 4 Deal 
Law., no. 4, July-Aug. 2010. 
 56. Dodd-Frank Act § 953. 
 57. Id. § 953(b)(1)(A)–(C). 
 58. Id. § 954. 
 59. Id. § 952(b)(1). However, compensation committees are not actually required to hire an 
independent consultant; they only need to do the independence analysis, but are then free to select a 
consultant of their choice. See id. The factors affecting advisors’ independence include the provision of 
other services to the company by the advisor, the amount of fees received from the company by the 
advisor as a percentage of total revenue of the advisor, the policies and procedures of the advisor that 
are designed to prevent conflicts of interest, any business or personal relationship of the consultant 
with a compensation committee member or an executive offer, and any company stock owned by the 
advisor. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, § 303A.05(c). 
 60. Dodd-Frank Act § 952(b)(2)(D). 
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II.  Organizational Behavior Literature 
As discussed in Subpart I.A, financial economists have conducted 
studies that produced inconsistent results regarding executive 
compensation. This Part explores the traditional model for directors’ 
determination of management compensation—the optimal contracting 
theory—and discusses the psychological aspects of boardroom dynamics 
that reveal shortcomings of that model and lead directors to favor 
executive interests over shareholder interests. These boardroom 
dynamics form the basis of this Article’s recommendations in Part III. 
A. Optimal Contracting Theory 
It is well-known in corporate law that the separation between 
management and ownership of corporations creates an agency problem 
that, theoretically, is addressed by having the shareholders appoint a board 
of directors that has the power to direct the affairs of the corporation and 
supervise management.61 Under the optimal contracting theory, directors 
are expected to bargain with management at arm’s length in order to set 
management’s compensation, with the exclusive goal of serving 
shareholders’ interests.62 This theory assumes that the board is not 
“captured” or controlled by the interests of management; it is instead 
sufficiently independent from management to bargain with management 
at arms’ length.63 Due to the separation of ownership and control of 
public companies, the board of directors, which is appointed by the 
shareholders to run the company, should design an optimal and efficient 
pay structure that aligns the interests of the CEO and the shareholders.64 
However, the empirical evidence in support of this result is mixed.65 
Financial economists have performed studies that test the arm’s length 
bargaining model, and their tests have yielded conflicting results.66 As 
explored further below, some empirical studies show that psychological 
factors, unaccounted for under optimal contracting theory, affect the 
relationship between the board and the CEO, playing a critical role in 
determining executive compensation.67 Indeed, the managerial power 
theory appears to be more realistic than the optimal contracting theory. 
 
 61. See generally Adolf A. Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property (1932). 
 62. See Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance 15–18 (2004); see also Omari 
Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive Compensation Reform, 
62 SMU L. Rev. 299, 315–17 (2009). 
 63. See Simmons, supra note 62, at 315. 
 64. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 62, at 17–18. 
 65. Charles A. O’Reilly III & Brian G. M. Main, Economic and Psychological Perspectives on 
CEO Compensation: A Review and Synthesis, 19 Indus. & Corp. Change 675, 679 (2010). 
 66. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 62, at 18. 
 67. E.g., O’Reilly & Main, supra note 65, at 675. 
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B. Managerial Power Theory 
In contrast to the optimal contracting model, some scholars have 
conducted empirical studies that support the managerial power theory.68 
These empirical studies suggest that managerial power and influence 
might be a better lens through which to view the process of setting 
executive compensation than the principal-agent/arm’s length bargaining 
model due to the captured nature of the board.69 As explained above, a 
board that has been “captured” by management serves the interests of 
management rather than shareholders. 
Many scholars, most prominently Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, 
have explored the effect of managerial power on the effectiveness of the 
compensation committee of the board of directors. In their well-known 
2006 book Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Executive Compensation, Bebchuk and Fried argue that the pay-setting 
process in public companies does not reflect arm’s length bargaining 
between executives and the boards who represent shareholders; boards 
have failed in their role as guardians of shareholder interests.70 The 
managerial power theory posits that directors are subject to influence 
from management that enables management to extract “rents”—extra 
value beyond what management would obtain under arm’s length 
bargaining—during the pay-setting process.71 
On the other hand, some scholars disagree with the managerial power 
theory. For example, Stephen Bainbridge argues that empirical evidence 
does not support the managerial power model.72 He notes “that there are 
relatively modest differences in pay practices between firms that have a 
controlling shareholder and those with dispersed share ownership,”73 even 
though one would not expect a controlling shareholder to permit 
management to extract rents at its expense. “As such, the observation that 
the allegedly questionable compensation practices occur both in 
companies with dispersed ownership and those with concentrated 
 
 68. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 62, at 63 (citing Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are, 116 Q. J. Econ. 901 (2001); Olivier 
Jean Blanchard et al., What Do Firms Do with Cash Windfalls?, 36 J. Fin. Econ. 337 (1994); David 
Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements, 52 J. Fin. 
449 (1997)). See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the 
Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751 (2002).  
 69. O’Reilly & Main, supra note 65, at 675; see Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the 
Other? Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 
30 J. Corp. L. 255, 255 (2005) (describing the results of an experimental model of the executive 
compensation process that indicate that the managerial power theory is correct that CEOs’ power over 
directors results in excessive compensation). 
 70. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 62, at x, 61. 
 71. Id. at 61. 
 72. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Is ‘Say on Pay’ Justified?, Regulation, Spring 2009, at 42, 44. 
 73. Id. 
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ownership may suggest that those practices are attributable to 
phenomena other than managerial control.”74  
Other scholars have noted that “the six-fold increase of CEO pay 
between 1980 and 2003 can be fully attributed to the six-fold increase in 
market capitalization of large U.S. companies.”75 That is to say, the 
increase in CEO pay during that period was aligned with the increase in 
value of shareholders’ stock, which suggests that executive compensation 
was appropriately designed to serve shareholder interests. 
Although Bebchuk and Fried have written extensively in this area, 
other scholars have contributed to the literature as well, particularly 
regarding the director independence issue.76 “[T]he results of empirical 
studies examining the influence of independent directors on [a] board’s 
decision-making process are inconclusive.”77 For example, one scholar 
notes that “there is no evidence to suggest that appointing a wholly 
independent compensation committee will ensure better risk 
management” perhaps partially because “the definition of ‘independence’ 
is elusive; cognitive biases limit directors’ ability to act or make decisions 
in a manner consistent with a theoretical perception of independence.”78 
Other scholars recommend that boards “change the structural, social and 
psychological environment of the board so that directors (even those 
who fulfill the requirements of independence) no longer see themselves 
as effectively employees of the CEO.”79 
C. Psychological Theories 
The managerial influence discussed above is arguably caused by 
various psychological and sociological factors that incentivize directors to 
approve generous compensation packages for the management team of 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (citing Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?, 
123 Q.J. Econ. 49, 49 (2008)). 
 76. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & Harwell Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board 
Capture, Optimal Contracting, and Officers’ Fiduciary Duties, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 846, 848 (2011) 
(“Board Capture provides an underlying justification for overhauling the entire system and its 
supporters have pressed for sweeping changes to the current system.”). 
 77. Kristin N. Johnson, Addressing Gaps in the Dodd-Frank Act: Directors’ Risk Management 
Oversight Obligations, 45 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 55, 99 (2011) (citing Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, 
The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. Law. 921, 
924–26 (1999); Eliezer M. Fich & Lawrence J. White, CEO Compensation and Turnover: The Effects 
of Mutually Interlocked Boards, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 935, 936 (2003); Idalene F. Kesner et al., 
Board Composition and the Commission of Illegal Acts: An Investigation of Fortune 500 Companies, 
29 Acad. Mgmt. J. 789, 794–96 (1986)). 
 78. Id. (citing Bhagat & Black, supra note 77, at 923; Lisa Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside 
Director, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 127 (2010)). 
 79. O’Reilly & Main, supra note 65, at 675 (citing Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, 
Remuneration: Where We’ve Been, How We Got to Here, What the Problems Are, and How to Fix 
Them 9 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 44/2004, 2004)). 
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the company on whose board the directors serve. As explained by 
Bebchuk and Fried: 
Directors have had various economic incentives to support, or at least 
go along with, arrangements favorable to the company’s top 
executives. Various social and psychological factors—collegiality, team 
spirit, a natural desire to avoid conflict within the board team, and 
sometimes friendship and loyalty—have also pulled board members in 
that direction. . . . A substantial body of evidence does indeed indicate 
that pay has been higher, and less sensitive to performance, when 
executives have more power.80 
Of particular interest, Bebchuk and Fried believed that the rule 
implemented by the NYSE in 2003, that required compensation 
committee members to be independent, would weaken, but not 
eliminate, the factors that lead directors to favor executives at the 
expense of shareholders.81 
Norms of reciprocity, groupthink, polarization, social cascades, and 
herding are some of the psychological factors that can lead boards to 
approve excessive levels of executive compensation. These factors are 
described further below. 
1. Norms of Reciprocity 
Scholars have found that the following factors play a key role in the 
establishment of high levels of CEO pay: indebtedness, deference to 
authority, social forces, social status, and peer group comparison.82 In 
particular, studies have found that a compensation committee chair is 
more likely to approve a large compensation package for the CEO if the 
chair (1) was appointed to the board during the tenure of the current 
CEO rather than her predecessor; (2) makes more money than the CEO; 
and/or (3) is of a lower socioeconomic status than the CEO.83 
These studies reveal that norms of reciprocity that affect all social 
interactions are present in boards as well. For example, compensation 
committee chairs presumably approve higher CEO pay if they were 
appointed during the CEO’s tenure because they feel indebted to the CEO 
for being appointed to her board. Although directors are technically 
appointed by the nominating committee, which must be composed entirely 
of independent directors under NYSE listing requirements, CEOs still 
have significant influence on the nomination process.84 Indeed, “[f]ar from 
 
 80. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 62, at 4–5. 
 81. Id. at 43. However, the new independence requirement imposed by Dodd-Frank is 
supplemental to this preexisting independence requirement. See supra Subpart I.B. 
 82. Bebchuk et al., supra note 68, at 783–95. 
 83. O’Reilly & Main, supra note 65, at 687–703. 
 84. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 62, at 26 (citing Brian G. M. Main et al., The CEO, the Board of 
Directors and Executive Compensation: Economics & Psychological Perspectives, 4 Indus. & Corp. 
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being selected by shareholders, directors frequently are selected for 
consideration by the CEO. Although the slate of directors is put forward 
by the nominating committee, the names on the slate are generally 
suggested by the CEO.”85 
Directors are also likely to identify with the CEO because many 
directors are CEOs of other public companies; as such, they are less likely 
to view high levels of CEO compensation as exorbitant.86 CEOs who serve 
as directors of other companies have self-interested incentives to approve 
high compensation for the CEOs of the companies on whose board they 
serve because CEO pay is set using peer group comparisons.87 In addition, 
directors have incentives to approve high levels of pay in order to remain 
in the good graces of the CEO and retain their board seat. Directors 
enjoy significant fees for serving on the board and board committees. 
The median values of such fees were approximately $200,000 for board 
service and $7500 for committee service as of 2009.88 As of 2012, the 
median fee for outside directors of the biggest companies was 
$244,637 according to the National Association of Corporate Directors.89 
Although these figures might not be large enough to motivate some 
wealthy directors, directorships often generate additional directorships, 
such that many directors serve on multiple boards and generate board 
fees from multiple companies simultaneously.90 Moreover, directors 
receive significant prestige—and sometimes perquisites—for serving on 
boards, and membership can generate business and social connections.91 
As explained above, norms of reciprocity may motivate corporate 
directors to approve high amounts of executive compensation. Moreover, 
studies show that reciprocity is more likely to occur when groups are 
 
Change 293 (1995); Cynthia A. Montgomery & Rhonda Kaufman, The Board’s Missing Link, 
81 Harv. Bus. Rev. 86, 89 (2003)). 
 85. Erica Beecher-Monas, The Risks of Reward: The Role of Executive Compensation in Financial 
Crisis, 6 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 101, 119 (2011). 
 86. Id. at 120 (citing Michael B. Dorff, Softening Pharaoh’s Heart: Harnessing Altruistic Theory 
and Behavioral Law and Economics to Rein in Executive Salaries, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 811, 845 n.145 
(2003) (“CEOs of other companies constitute some 63% of outside directors”); Korn/Ferry Int’l, 
30th Annual Board of Directors Study 10 (2003) (finding that eighty-three percent of boards 
included a CEO or chief operating officer of another firm in 2002)). 
 87. Id. at 121. 
 88. Theresa Tovar & Robert Newbury, Has Director Pay Found Its Floor?, Executive 
Compensation Bull. (Towers Watson), Aug. 2010, at 3, 6. 
 89. Joann S. Lublin, The 40-Year Club: America’s Longest Serving Directors, Wall St. J. (July 16, 
2013, 7:45 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323664204578607924055967366.html. 
 90. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, Corporate Boards Should Add Diversity to the Mix, N.Y. Times 
DealBook (Mar. 8, 2011, 5:41 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/08/corporate-boards-should-
add-diversity-to-the-mix (noting one executive that held over thirty board positions). 
 91. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 62, at 25. But see Davidoff, supra note 90 (noting that director 
positions have “become less of a perquisite or a way to build client relationships and more of a job” 
due to increased time obligations of approximately 225 hours per year). 
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small and homogeneous and continue to interact over time.92 Corporate 
boards tend to be small and homogenous, as is discussed further below. 
Additionally, directors often interact indefinitely over time (provided 
they are reelected to the board) because most directors are not subject to 
term limits.93 In fact, over one-third of independent directors of Russell 
3000 companies have served a decade or longer, and twenty-eight of 
them (albeit less than one percent) have served for at least forty years.94 
It is difficult for independent directors to remain truly independent in 
thought when they serve on the same board for decades.95 Accordingly, 
the Council of Institutional Investors—a governance advocate—plans to 
encourage shareholders and boards to question the independence of 
directors with very long tenures, and proxy advisors are beginning to 
consider new policies that would deem outside directors non-independent 
if they have served on the board for long terms.96 
2. Groupthink, Polarization, Social Cascades, and Herding 
a. Groupthink 
Groupthink is another psychological factor that can impact 
corporate boards. Indeed, one scholar articulated a Group Dynamics 
Theory to encapsulate his argument that “the problems with CEO 
compensation in public corporations may be caused at least in part by the 
decision-making flaws rooted in group dynamics,” such as groupthink.97 
Groupthink is the tendency of cohesive and homogenous groups to 
adopt homogenous views and faulty decisionmaking due to failure to 
consider alternatives.98 Groupthink is more likely to occur when a 
cohesive group has structural organizational faults and/or a provocative 
situational context such as high stress, difficult decisions to be made, recent 
group failures, or difficult moral dilemmas99—these are arguably common 
factors in the pay-setting process. Irving Janis identified eight symptoms of 
groupthink: (1) illusions of invulnerability; (2) unquestioned belief in the 
morality of the group; (3) rationalization for dismissing warnings; 
 
 92. O’Reilly & Main, supra note 65, at 685. 
 93. See, e.g., Lublin, supra note 89 (discussing directors that have served over forty years). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.; Bob Romanchek & Jeff Keckley, Director Independence: A Focus on Board Tenure, 
Directorship (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.directorship.com/director-independence-a-focus-on-board-
tenure. 
 97. Michael B. Dorff, The Group Dynamics Theory of Executive Compensation, 28 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 2025, 2029 (2007). 
 98. See id. at 2035–42 (discussing groupthink extensively). 
 99. Andrew Howard, Groupthink and Corporate Governance Reform: Changing the Formal and 
Informal Decisionmaking Processes of Corporate Boards, 20 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 425, 427 (2011) 
(citing Irving L. Janis, Groupthink 176–77 (2d ed. 1982)). 
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(4) stereotypes of group opponents as weak, evil, biased, spiteful, 
impotent, or stupid; (5) self-censorship of ideas that deviate from the 
consensus; (6) illusions of unanimity among group members; (7) direct 
pressure to conform applied to members who question the group; and 
(8) mind guards who shield the group from dissenting information.100 
Corporate boards tend to be homogenous, which predisposes them 
to groupthink. Because board members are often selected from a small 
pool, they often have similar educational, professional, and other 
affiliations and relationships before they join the board.101 Moreover, 
normally independent directors might share strong social ties with the 
CEO, such as belonging to the same social clubs, civic organizations, or 
simply being friends.102 This can have troubling results for independent 
directors charged with monitoring executives because having a social 
relationship “disposes one to interpret favorably another’s intentions and 
actions.”103 
Moreover, independence can even be strained by shared connections 
that do not rise to the level of strong social ties. Affinity caused by shared 
backgrounds, for example, has been shown to affect director 
decisionmaking.104 Byoung-Hyoun Hwang and Seoyoung Kim conducted 
an interesting empirical study of Fortune 100 companies from 1996 to 
2005 and found that common backgrounds between CEOs and their 
nominally independent directors resulted in higher CEO pay.105 
Specifically, they found that having a “socially independent board,” in 
which a majority of directors are both conventionally and socially 
independent, has a statistically significant effect in reducing CEO 
compensation: “the average drop in total compensation [was] 
$3.3 million, while average total compensation for the sample [was] 
$12.8 million.”106 A nominally independent director was considered 
“socially dependent” if she had two or more social ties with the 
 
 100. Id. at 431–34. 
 101. Johnson, supra note 77, at 104 (citing Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate 
Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 Geo. 
L.J. 797, 810 n.60 (2001)); see Dorff, supra note 97, at 2045 (“Public company directors are generally 
either CEOs of other public companies or firm lawyers, investment bankers, former politicians, or 
prominent academics.”). 
 102. Frederick Tung, The Puzzle of Independent Directors: New Learning, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 1175, 
1179 (2011). 
 103. Id. (quoting Brian Uzzi, The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic 
Performance of Organizations: The Network Effect, 61 Am. Soc. Rev. 674, 678 (1996)). 
 104. Id. at 1180 (citing Byoung-Hyoun Hwang & Seoyoung Kim, It Pays to Have Friends, 93 J. Fin. 
Econ. 138, 139 (2009)). 
 105. Id. at 1180–82. 
 106. Id. at 1182 (citing Hwang & Kim, supra note 104, at 146). However, Hwang and Kim’s study 
has some limitations—for example, they did not control for the more commonly identified social 
influences that have been shown to affect CEO pay. Id. at 1184. The study also seems to focus on the 
social ties of the overall board rather than just the compensation committee. See id. 
Grant_21 (B. Buchwalter) (Do Not Delete) 4/9/2014 4:37 PM 
April 2014]    INDEPENDENT YET CAPTURED 781 
company’s CEO, such as “mutual alma mater, military service, regional 
origin, academic discipline, [or] industry.”107 Thus, “Hwang and Kim’s 
study offers important empirical evidence confirming our suspicions that 
existing definitions of independence may not capture all the potential 
influences that may affect directors’ impartiality.”108 
The homogeneity of corporate boards is also attributable to a lack 
of gender and racial diversity.109 Many scholars have argued that 
increasing diversity might strengthen corporate boards. For example, 
Lisa Fairfax indicates that “[m]ost social and psychological data on group 
dynamics suggest that having a diverse group of directors will facilitate a 
board’s decision-making function because that data reveals that 
heterogeneous groups tend to make higher quality decisions.”110  
Furthermore, age similarity has been shown to enhance social 
influence. For example, one study found that CEO compensation is 
higher if the CEO and compensation committee members are closer in 
age.111 As such, a board with greater age diversity might be less subject to 
social influence by the CEO.  
Groupthink occurs because people make decisions based on their 
perspective, which is shaped and limited by their personal backgrounds.112 
Adding directors with diverse backgrounds can facilitate the consideration 
of other viewpoints.113 However, while diversity can reduce groupthink, 
and most directors support board diversity, corporate board diversity has 
not increased much over the years, and some directors question its 
value.114 
 
 107. Id. at 1181–82 (citing Hwang & Kim, supra note 104, at 140–42 (explaining how these social 
ties produce enhanced interaction, shared experiences, and common interests)). 
 108. Id. at 1185. 
 109. For example, a recent study found that white men hold nearly seventy percent of Fortune 100 
board seats, women (of all races) hold twenty percent, and minorities (of both genders) hold sixteen 
percent (though they comprise thirty-seven percent of the population). Martha C. White, Top 
Boardrooms: No-Go Areas for Women, Minorities, NBCNews.com (Aug. 16, 2013 4:51 PM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/business/top-boardrooms-no-go-areas-women-minorities-6C10936005 
(referencing Alliance for Bd. Diversity, Missing Pieces: Women and Minorities on Fortune 500 
Boards (2010)). 
 110. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Business 
Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 795, 831. 
 111. Tung, supra note 102, at 1179 (citing Main et al., supra note 84, at 319–20). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Davidoff, supra note 90 (arguing that greater diversity on corporate boards is needed, and 
noting that “[a]dding two or three board members with more diverse backgrounds could spur more 
critical thinking — a type of introspection that was absent before the crisis”). 
 114. Kimberly D. Krawiec et al., The Danger of Difference: Tension in Directors’ Views of 
Corporate Board Diversity, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 919, 920–22; see David A. Carter et al., The Gender 
and Ethnic Diversity of U.S. Boards and Board Committees and Firm Financial Performance, 18 Corp. 
Governance 396, 396 (2010) (finding that “[w]e do not find a significant relationship between the 
gender or ethnic diversity of the board, or important board committees, and financial performance for 
a sample of major US corporations”). 
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b. Polarization 
Homogenous groups are also prone to polarization—taking extreme 
positions.115 This, of course, presents particular concerns in the 
compensation-setting process because: 
even if the individual members of a compensation committee would 
prefer a more modest pay package, if the group has a predilection 
toward higher pay levels, that will be the decision. This phenomenon is 
more acute when the group is homogeneous, as it tends to be at the 
upper echelon of corporate management, because if group members 
share a particular bias, polarization may magnify its impact.116 
c. Social Cascades 
Corporate boards can also be affected by social cascades. Social 
cascades are dynamics in which people follow a leader’s actions because 
they lack sufficient information to form their own opinions about a 
decision.117 In the compensation-setting context, social cascades can occur 
when the compensation committee is unduly swayed by the opinion of 
the CEO or the compensation consultants who are retained to prepare 
and present compensation packages. 
Indeed, compensation committees in the post-Dodd-Frank 
environment are particularly susceptible to social cascades. As explained 
by Fairfax: 
[The recent reforms] increase the possibility that boards will unduly 
rely on management, advisors, and outside consultants in a manner 
that could have significant negative repercussions. . . . [A]necdotal and 
other evidence suggest that when directors believe that they lack the 
necessary expertise to grapple with particular issues, they tend to rely 
more heavily on managers and other advisors perceived to have such 
expertise. From this perspective, it is no surprise that the growing 
influence of compensation consultants coincides with the increased 
emphasis on independent directors who often may feel ill equipped to 
tackle the complexities of compensation matters. Finally, increasing 
shareholders’ power [through say-on-pay votes, proxy access, etc.] also 
may increase the potential for enhanced reliance on outside 
consultants such as proxy and advisory firms.118 
Subpart III.A proposes continuing professional education to remedy 
this social cascades factor. 
 
 115. Beecher-Monas, supra note 85, at 124. 
 116. Id. (citing Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarization: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1141, 1141 (1986)). 
 117. Dorff, supra note 97, at 2042–52 (discussing social cascades extensively). 
 118. Lisa M. Fairfax, Government Governance and the Need to Reconcile Government Regulation 
with Board Fiduciary Duties, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 1692, 1719–20 (2011). 
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d. Herding 
Social cascades and groupthink are closely related to another 
phenomenon: herding. As discussed above, directors often have personal 
ties to each other and the CEO. These personal ties can lead to herding, 
which is the tendency of group members to follow the crowd when 
making decisions, despite having other information.119 Furthermore, 
compensation consultants might propose similar pay packages to 
multiple companies due to the herding phenomenon.120 
Part III of this Article now explores ways in which the organizational 
behavior findings described above can be applied to improve the process 
of setting executive compensation. 
III.  Critique of Dodd-Frank and Proposal for Additional 
Reforms 
Parts I and II of this Article show that Dodd-Frank’s compensation 
committee independence requirement does not address certain 
organizational behavior factors that can impair directors’ objectivity. This 
Part tackles the question of how we can use the organizational behavior 
findings described above to improve the independent judgment of 
compensation committees. Ultimately, this analysis shows that (1) the SEC 
appropriately determined that it was impractical to require consideration 
of personal relationships in the independence assessment, but 
(2) additional reforms are needed to counteract the organizational 
behavior issues that might impair independent action. To that end, this 
Article recommends two additional reforms, and to provide an 
international perspective, positions those reforms within the global 
corporate governance landscape. 
As described in Subpart I.C, Dodd-Frank’s executive compensation 
reforms were intended to increase the independence, accountability, and 
transparency of the pay-setting process. The compensation committee 
independence requirement, especially when combined with the 
compensation advisor independence analysis, is intended to diminish 
conflicts of interest that can occur when the members of the compensation 
committee and/or their advisors lack independence and objectivity to 
determine executive compensation in an arm’s length fashion. 
While the goal of greater independence is sensible, independent 
judgment and action will not be achieved unless the social dynamics that 
impact boardrooms and discourage board members from thinking and 
acting independently are addressed. The problem is that the independence 
rules ignore social influence and assume “away social norms and social 
 
 119. Beecher-Monas, supra note 85, at 129. 
 120. Id. 
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pressures that we know affect behavior.”121 Indeed, “[f]ormal 
independence without social independence may be insufficient to assure 
the effectiveness of independent directors.”122 The compensation 
committee independence reform does not directly address this issue; 
rather, it focuses only on whether a director has received compensation 
other than director fees or has affiliations with the company. Moreover, 
similar factors were already in the preexisting rule as suggested (albeit 
not mandatory) considerations, so the new rule does not substantially 
change the independence analysis. 
A. Consideration of Personal Relationships 
 One solution to the organizational behavior issues would be to 
mandate the consideration of personal relationships in the determination 
of director independence. As described in Subpart I.B, to qualify as 
independent, a director may not have any “material relationship” with 
the listed company.123 “Material relationships can include commercial, 
industrial, banking, consulting, legal, accounting, charitable and familial 
relationships, among others.”124 However, there is no explicit requirement 
to consider personal or social relationships—although boards are 
instructed to “broadly consider all relevant facts and circumstances” that 
might signal potential conflicts of interest.125 This presents the question of 
whether the language in the independence definition is already broad 
enough to encourage boards to consider personal relationships, or 
whether something more explicit is needed. Although “familial” 
relationships are included in the list above, personal relationships are 
not. Further, the list does not mandate that boards consider any of the 
listed relationships; it only suggests them for possible consideration. 
Before adopting the new independence rule in 2013, the SEC issued 
a proposed rule in 2011 and sought comments on it.126 Specifically, the 
SEC asked for comments as to whether the exchanges should be 
required to include personal or business relationships between a 
compensation committee member and an executive officer of the 
company, as mandatory factors for consideration, in addition to the Fees 
Factor and the Affiliate Factor.127 Several commentators responded 
 
 121. Tung, supra note 102, at 1178. 
 122. Id. at 1177 (noting that “socially dependent directors” are nominally independent directors 
who share a common background with the CEO). 
 123. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, § 303A.02. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Listing Standards for Compensation Committees, Release Nos. 33-9199, 34-64149, 46 Fed. 
Reg. 18,966 (Apr. 6, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240). 
 127. Id. at 18,971 (The SEC asked: “Should there be additional factors apart from the two 
proposed factors required to be considered? For example, should the exchanges be required to include 
business or personal relationships between a compensation committee member and an executive officer 
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affirmatively, and although these comments were not ultimately adopted, 
they provide helpful insight regarding independence issues. 
For example, the National Association of Corporate Directors 
recommended that in nominating compensation committee members, the 
“governance/nominating committee and the board should take account 
of personal friendships, prior business relationships, and even ties 
created by philanthropic activities between the CEO and the prospective 
committee member” because these “types of relationships may interfere 
with the committee member’s objectivity in evaluating CEO performance 
and setting executive pay.”128 Also, the Council of Institutional Investors 
urged the SEC to consider family linkages, ties to executive officers and 
relationships with other directors, in addition to the existing standards 
when defining the independence standards for compensation committee 
members.129 
Several commentators also noted that board interlocks, which occur 
when executives serve on each other’s boards, can impair independence.130 
Indeed, as a former CEO commented, “[t]he most effective way to 
encourage independence of compensation committee members is to 
prohibit interlocking corporate directorships. ‘You scratch my back, I’ll 
scratch yours’ is all too common, especially when officers are on one 
another’s boards.”131 Conflicts of interests can also arise if a director is an 
executive officer of another company whose peer group includes the 
company on whose board she serves, because her decisions about the 
compensation of executives at that company might affect her own 
employee compensation due to the use of peer group comparisons in 
setting executive pay.132 
 
of the issuer as mandatory factors for consideration? Should the exchanges be required to include 
board interlocks or employment of a director at a company included in the listed issuer’s 
compensation peer group as mandatory factors for consideration? Would any such requirements 
unduly restrain a company in setting the composition of its board of directors?” (emphasis added)). 
 128. Letter from Barbara H. Franklin & Kenneth Daly, Nat’l Ass’n of Corporate Dirs., to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 29, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-29.pdf (concerning the proposed rules for listing 
standards for compensation committees and referencing a report from 2003). 
 129. Letter from Justin Levis, Senior Research Assoc., Council of Institutional Investors, to 
Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 20, 2011), at 2–3, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-12.pdf. 
 130. See, e.g., Letter from Georg Merkl to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
(Apr. 1, 2011), at 4–5, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-2.pdf; see also Levis, 
supra note 129, at 3. 
 131. Letter from John K. Lundberg, former CEO Crum Forster, to U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
(Mar. 31, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-1.htm. 
 132. Merkl, supra note 130, at 5. See Letter from Gerald W. McEntee, Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & 
Mun. Emps., to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 29, 2011), at 2–3, available 
at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-31.pdf; see Meredith Miller, Chief Corp. Governance 
Officer, UAW Retiree Med. Benefits Trust, to Elizabeth Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
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In the litigation context, courts have also voiced similar concern that 
directors who meet the independence requirements are still subject to 
managerial influence. For example, the Delaware Chancery Court has 
suggested in some litigation matters that social, civic, and personal 
connections (such as shared university attendance or golf club 
membership) should be considered in assessing the independence of 
directors.133 In In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation, the Delaware 
Chancery Court refused to abide by a decision of the special litigation 
committee of independent directors because their ties to Stanford 
University due to shared university attendance, donation, or employment, 
created reasonable doubt as to the directors’ impartiality.134 
In a more recent case involving Barnes & Noble, the Delaware 
Chancery Court suggested that friendship, frequent socialization, and 
golf playing could impair the independence of putatively independent 
directors.135 These Delaware decisions reflect a judicial acknowledgment 
that the determination of true independence might require consideration 
of personal ties in addition to the existing independence standards.136 On 
the other hand, some commentators believe that the listing standards 
should not adopt per se prohibitions on specific relationships because the 
listing standards are sufficiently broad to permit appropriate consideration 
of all factors that affect independence.137 
Moreover, it does not seem feasible to prohibit independent 
directors from having personal ties to executives, given the pervasiveness 
of personal relationships between board members and executives and 
 
(Apr. 27, 2011), at 1–3, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-15.pdf (providing 
comments similar to those of McEntee); supra text accompanying note 84. 
 133. Richard E. Wood, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nicholson Graham LLP, Compensation 
Committee Structure, Function and Best Practices 7–10, 13 (2004) (citing Biondi v. Scrushy, 
820 A.2d 1148 (Del. Ch. 2003); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003)). But 
see Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004). 
 134. In re Oracle Corp., 824 A.2d at 920. 
 135. Steven M. Davidoff, How Independent Are Barnes & Noble Directors?, N.Y. Times 
DealBook (Oct. 25, 2010, 2:28 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/10/25/how-independent-are-
barnes-noble-directors. However, Judge Strine eventually dismissed the case against the directors who 
allegedly unfairly sided with the chairman. Phil Milford & Jef Feeley, Barnes & Noble Wins Dismissal 
of 4 Directors from Lawsuit, Bloomberg (Mar. 27, 2012, 1:22 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-
03-27/barnes-noble-wins-dismissal-of-4-directors-from-lawsuit.html. The chairman of Barnes & Noble 
settled the remaining claim. See Phil Milford & Jef Feeley, Barnes & Noble Chief Said to Settle Suit for 
$29 Million, Businessweek (June 14, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-13/barnes-
and-noble-chief-said-to-settle-suit-for-29-million. 
 136. Davidoff, supra note 135. 
 137. See, e.g., Letter from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 28, 2011), at 2–3, available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-11/s71311-
18.pdf (noting “we do not believe that there should be any inference that the existing listing standards 
do not already adequately address the considerations of all of the facts and circumstances surrounding 
a director’s relationship with the issuer, or the issuer’s management, that may affect compensation 
committee member independence and are consistent with the objectives of the Dodd-Frank Act and 
the proposed rulemaking”).  
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obvious difficulties in measuring, monitoring, and evaluating such ties. 
For example, how would one evaluate the many social ties that directors 
and executives have from attending the same Masters of Business 
Administration programs, places of worship, and/or country clubs? 
Clearly, it would be impractical to disallow all such ties. Further, 
personal relationships can take on many forms, and it would be difficult 
to define and determine which relationships are more problematic than 
others from an independence standpoint. Indeed, as explained by Tung: 
Rather than driving us to rethink independence requirements, Hwang 
and Kim’s findings may instead cast doubt that a workable definition of 
independence exists that could possibly capture the variety of shared 
experiences that might dampen conventionally independent directors’ 
monitoring incentives. Any such attempt at rulemaking would be 
unavoidably over-and underinclusive.138 
In short, “social incentives are messy; they are difficult to measure 
or analyze rigorously. Perhaps that explains why social influences on 
nominally independent directors have only recently begun to draw 
scholarly attention.”139 In addition, although diversity caused by hiring 
directors with fewer social ties could be helpful in stimulating alternative 
viewpoints, it could also undermine trust on boards and lessen directors’ 
effectiveness.140 
Tung argues that although the appropriate policy response to 
Hwang and Kim’s study is unclear, “we may need to rely on the fine-
grained ex post analysis of judges, as exemplified by Vice Chancellor 
Strine in Oracle” because “shared experiences and other social 
influences may be too numerous and subtle for comprehensive ex ante 
enumeration.”141 However, this Article suggests an ex ante approach that 
would reduce the need for judges to detect and undo, on an ex post basis, 
the effect of the proverbial “golden handcuffs” that bind nominally 
independent directors to CEOs. Also, the recommendations proposed 
herein will mitigate the impact of personal relationships on board 
dynamics in a manner that is more practical than injecting personal 
relationships into the independence assessment. 
 
 138. Tung, supra note 102, at 1185. Tung further notes that although then-current definitions of 
director independence could perhaps be improved, “Hwang and Kim’s interesting findings may not 
translate easily to crafting stricter definitions of independence.” Id. For more information on Hwang 
and Kim’s findings, see supra Subpart II.C.2. 
 139. Tung, supra note 102, at 1178. 
 140. Fairfax, supra note 110, at 833 (citing Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trust 
Worthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1735, 1796–99 
(2001) (discussing the importance of trust in corporate decisionmaking)). 
 141. Tung, supra note 102, at 1185. 
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B. Comparative Law Considerations 
From a comparative law standpoint, the United States is the 
originator of the concept of independent directors, and is still its most 
enthusiastic supporter.142 Director independence in the European Union 
typically follows the U.S. model of not considering social ties.143 Director 
independence typically encompasses only financial and familial 
independence from controlling shareholders and top corporate officers.144 
Even if the director has “social ties to the controller,” she will be 
considered independent as long as she has “no close family or financial 
ties, such as an employment position or a consulting relationship.”145 
However, such independence is often token, especially in countries such as 
Germany and France, which have supervisory boards that are comprised 
of shareholder representatives and employee representatives, as each of 
such groups represents the interests of the group that appointed it.146 
C. Recommendations 
In light of all the above considerations, this Article advocates a 
creative approach to augmenting the independence of compensation 
committee members, while avoiding the concerns noted above. The 
Article proposes two reforms: (1) a requirement for compensation 
committee members to have continuing professional education regarding 
compensation issues and (2) a rotation system that encourages the 
compensation committee (or at least the chair thereof) to rotate off the 
committee after a certain number of years. The remainder of this Article 
addresses these two recommendations in turn. 
These reforms are similar to the requirements under Sarbanes-
Oxley that require (1) financial literacy of all members—and financial 
expertise of at least one member—of the audit committee and (2) the 
lead and concurring partners of the accounting firm that conducts a 
company’s audit to rotate off the client engagement every five years.147 
1. Continuing Professional Education 
The first recommendation is that compensation committee members 
should be required to have continuing professional education to ensure 
that they are knowledgeable and up to date regarding best practices in 
executive compensation, as well as the complex business, legal, tax, and 
 
 142. Reinier Kraakman et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law 65 (2d ed. 2009). 
 143. Id. at 95. 
 144. Id. at 182 (noting that unlike the United States, corporations in several E.U. countries such as 
Italy and France typically have large blockholders, such as the state or families). 
 145. Id. at 95. 
 146. Id. at 64–65. 
 147. Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407 (2013). 
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accounting considerations that affect executive compensation decisions. 
These rules are complex and evolving. Knowledge of fundamental 
principles and best practices can help improve decisionmaking. 
Requiring professional education will help to ensure that compensation 
committees are fully equipped to make appropriate decisions regarding 
executive compensation packages, and are not overly influenced by 
possible pressure from compensation consultants or the CEO. This is 
especially important for the director who has the difficult role of 
compensation committee chair. 
This recommendation is timely: a recent in-depth examination of 
compensation committee processes of twenty large U.S. public companies 
revealed that this consideration of expertise and independence is one of 
the five main considerations for compensation committees.148 The study 
revealed that “[w]hile many boards consider director expertise and 
independence in determining who will serve on the compensation 
committee, many of the interviewees had previous professional or 
personal ties to management before joining the board. Thus, in reality, 
actual independence was sometimes not emphasized.”149 One of the 
implications of this finding was that “compensation committee members 
need the right background and mind-set to understand executive 
compensation issues at a deep level, including the fairness of committee 
decisions in the eyes of shareholders and managers.”150 Directors of 
public companies “tend to be highly intelligent, educated, sophisticated, 
and busy” but might lack knowledge about specific compensation 
practices.151 Moreover, the study “revealed that compensation committee 
members felt a profound tension between the demands of management 
and those of shareholders. One interviewee noted that the compensation 
committee ‘is the only board committee where you sit on the opposite 
side of the table from management.’”152 
a. Support for Continuing Education and Relationship to 
Organizational Behavior Theory 
Several practitioners have discussed in practitioner journals the 
general need for compensation committee members to be knowledgeable. 
This Article takes the next step of proposing mandatory education, 
 
 148. Dana R. Hermanson et al., What Are Compensation Committee Members Thinking About?, 
Directorship (Jan. 24, 2013, 8:48 PM), http://www.directorship.com/what-are-compensation-
committee-members-thinking-about. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Dorff, supra note 97, at 2045 (emphasis omitted) (“[Directors] have little incentive to spend 
time working through the details of a complex compensation package, much less to dream up alternatives 
to the traditional forms of compensation. They are far more likely to defer to the status quo, assuming 
that the sophisticated boards that have made this decision before them have acted correctly.”). 
 152. Hermanson et al., supra note 148. 
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coupled with a rotation program, and it grounds such recommendations 
within a scholarly and theoretical framework. As explained by two 
executive compensation practitioners: 
Unlike audit committee members, there is no requirement for 
compensation committee members to have any particular expertise. 
However, it is beneficial for compensation committee members and 
top executives to be educated about compensation issues. The first 
area of education should be the company’s own plans and policies. 
General education about executive compensation can come from a 
variety of sources, including director institutes, compensation 
consultants and legal counsel.153 
Another executive compensation practitioner summarized similar 
views regarding education of compensation committee members as 
follows: 
A compensation committee can make “informed” decisions only if the 
committee members have adequate background and knowledge with 
respect to the matters under the committee’s consideration. While 
outside advisors can be relied upon for their technical expertise, 
committee members, who bear the decisionmaking responsibility, must 
be sufficiently conversant with compensation concepts, techniques and 
requirements to be able to determine for themselves the merits of all 
proposed actions. There are many resources available for director 
education in general and compensation committee education in 
particular. For example, the Conference Board created a directors’ 
institute to provide corporate governance education for directors 
serving on the boards of U.S. corporations. This program provides 
professional educational programs for corporate board members, 
dealing with a wide range of important board issues, including 
compensation. Also, both the NYSE and Nasdaq have announced 
programs to provide education for directors of listed companies.154 
Providing continuing professional education to compensation 
committee members will help reduce the effects of several of the 
organizational behavior factors identified in Subpart II.C. For example, it 
will help directors avoid the social cascades dynamic whereby directors 
blindly follow the recommendations of the compensation committee’s 
consultant, legal advisor, or chairperson because they lack sufficient 
information to make their own judgments about difficult decisions.155 
Education would decrease the tendency of groups to defer to one 
member who is perceived as being better informed, and counteract 
 
 153. Steven D. Kittrell & James P. McElligott Jr., Avoid the Disney Trap, in Focus on Executive 
Compensation 9–10 (2005). 
 154. Wood, supra note 133, at 14; see Press Release, N.Y. Stock Exch., NYSE Euronext 
Announces Plan to Launch Board Education Program (Mar. 9, 2011), available at 
http://www.nyse.com/press/1299669253730.html (noting that “[o]ur goal is to prepare company boards 
for the current governance environment in which investor groups and others have been successfully 
calling for more accountability and transparency in the boardroom,” using “conferences, events, 
publications, and online resources”). 
 155. See supra Subpart II.C.2. 
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groupthink and herding.156 Educating directors will empower them to 
formulate and ask tough questions about all compensation proposals and 
advice presented by their advisors, and to revise those proposals as 
appropriate. 
Although it is certainly appropriate and necessary for directors to 
seek advice and counsel, they will be better able to “come to the table” 
prepared to ask the right questions of their advisors if they have the 
requisite training and continuing education. Ultimately, although 
compensation committee members can receive excellent guidance from 
legal counsel and compensation consultants, the committee members are 
responsible for approving executive compensation packages. 
Some compensation committee members might understandably not 
want to invest time and resources in professional education. They are 
very busy, and the number of hours that directors are expected to spend 
on board service has risen to an average of 225 hours per year.157 
However, director education is becoming increasingly popular. In fact, a 
recent survey of public companies indicates that “[a]pproximately two 
companies out of 10 require their board members to attend some type of 
continuing education programs to remain abreast of regulatory and 
compliance developments.”158 Moreover, such education might help to 
insulate directors from liability because being well-informed before 
making business decisions is a requirement for reliance on the business 
judgment rule.159 
Furthermore, several changes in the governance landscape make 
continuing education a wise investment of time for directors. For 
example, compensation decisions have come under increased scrutiny 
due to public outrage over high amounts of pay and the embarrassment 
of negative say-on-pay votes. Further, directors risk losing their board 
seats due to “withhold campaigns” (i.e., shareholder attempts to 
withhold votes needed to reelect directors) if the compensation packages 
they approve receive negative say-on-pay votes from a majority of the 
company’s shareholders. The majority of companies had positive say-on-
pay votes in 2012 with substantial shareholder support, and only 
2.6% (fifty-seven companies) in the Russell 3000 failed.160 The results for 
2013 were very similar.161 However, there have been several highly 
 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Davidoff, supra note 90. 
 158. Matteo Tonello, The 2013 Director Compensation and Board Practices Report, Harv. L. Sch. 
F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. Blog (Feb. 26, 2013, 9:21 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ 
corpgov/2013/02/26/the-2013-director-compensation-and-board-practices-report. 
 159. Lewis H. Lazarus & Brett M. McCartney, Standards of Review in Conflict Transactions on 
Motions to Dismiss: Lessons Learned in the Past Decade, 36 Del. J. Corp. L. 967, 972–73 (2011). 
 160. Semler Brossy, 2012 Say on Pay Results: Russell 3000 Shareholder Voting 1 (2012). 
 161. Semler Brossy, 2013 Say on Pay Results: Russell 3000 Say On Pay Results 1 (2014) 
(noting that fifty-seven of 2250 companies failed). 
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publicized instances in which shareholders have issued failing say-on-pay 
votes. For example, Oracle failed its say-on-pay vote with only forty-one 
percent shareholder approval in 2012, and only forty-three percent 
approval in 2013.162 And shareholders are voting more negatively in the 
United States than in the United Kingdom, where they have historically 
been more reluctant to cast negative say-on-pay votes.163 
Moreover, shareholders have filed shareholder derivative lawsuits 
against several of the companies in the United States that received 
negative say-on-pay votes. The lawsuits, which are against the companies 
as well as their directors and compensation consultants, allege corporate 
waste, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duties, and other charges, 
due to the compensation arrangements that the directors approved. 
However, plaintiffs have faced significant obstacles in recent executive 
compensation lawsuits; indeed the cases typically do not progress beyond 
the demand stage.164 This is partially because Dodd-Frank expressly 
provides that the say-on-pay vote “may not be construed—(1) as 
overruling a decision of such issuer or board of directors; [or] (2) to 
create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of such issuer or board 
of directors”—as mentioned in Part I.C.165 
In addition to equipping directors to deal with increased 
shareholder oversight, continuing education also has the added benefit of 
increasing director primacy.166 Some scholars have argued that say-on-
pay and other reforms inappropriately shift the locus of decision-making 
authority from directors to activist shareholders in a way that “seems 
likely to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the public corporation 
practicable; namely, the vesting of ‘authoritative control’ in the board of 
 
 162. Id.; see Semler Brossy, Update: Oracle Fails Say on Pay with 41% Support, Say on Pay 
(Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.semlerbrossy.com/sop/update-oracle-fails-say-on-pay-with-41-support. 
 163. See, e.g., Thomas et al., supra note 6, at 1230 (citing Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: 
Cautionary Notes on the U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 Harv. J. on Legis. 
323, 341 (2009) (explaining that “shareholders invariably approve the Directors Remuneration 
Report, with perhaps eight turndowns across thousands of votes over a six-year experience”)). 
 164. See, e.g., Kyoko Takahashi Lin & Lawrence Portnoy, Say-on-Pay Litigation Update, 
DavisPolk Briefing: Governance (Sep. 5, 2012), http://www.davispolk.com/briefing/ 
corporategovernance/61662 (“These cases, decided by federal courts applying Delaware law, 
contribute to a line of cases holding that a failed shareholder say-on-pay vote alone does not rebut the 
business judgment rule presumption afforded to a board[’s] decisions, including in the realm of 
executive compensation.”). 
 165. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1376, § 951(c) (2010). But see Thomas & Wells, supra note 76, at 849 (“[R]ecent Delaware court decisions 
have given new life to officers’ fiduciary duties, not only by establishing that officers are bound by the 
same fiduciary duties as are directors, but by finding that officers’ fiduciary duty of loyalty has special 
application when those officers are negotiating their own compensation agreements.”) (emphasis added). 
 166. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547, 550 (2003) (noting that the director primacy theory asserts that 
“[n]either shareholders nor managers control corporations—boards of directors do”). 
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directors.”167 Empowering directors with continuing education will help 
shift the locus of decisionmaking authority back to the directors. In 
addition, companies must now disclose the “experience, qualifications, 
attributes or skills” of all board nominees and directors every year.168 
Yet, Dodd-Frank imposes additional responsibilities on directors without 
regard to whether directors have the expertise to carry out the duties.169 
The education requirement proposed in this Article will help companies 
satisfy the director expertise disclosure requirement. 
Moreover, both executive compensation law and accounting rules 
have become more sophisticated and complex in the past decade due to 
increased regulation.170 For example, in the case of executive 
compensation laws, complicated tax rules such as section 409A of the 
Internal Revenue Code (which deals with deferred compensation),171 and 
extensive SEC disclosure rules under Item 402 of Regulation S-K172 have 
made executive compensation a more technically challenging field than it 
was a decade ago. Although compensation committee members would 
certainly not be expected to have the same level of knowledge as their 
legal advisors and compensation consultants, they could attend 
continuing education sessions to stay abreast of compensation issues. For 
example, they could attend trainings on nuances such as (1) the levels 
and types of executive compensation that are considered “market;” 
(2) poor pay practices (such as single-trigger change in control bonus 
provisions) that might result in negative say-on-pay votes; (3) the pros 
and cons, from human resources, legal, and accounting standpoints, of 
granting various equity awards such as stock options, restricted stock, 
and/or restricted stock units; and (4) the tax implications of awarding 
various equity awards or deferred compensation. 
Furthermore, the proposed continuing education recommendation is 
similar to a post-Enron American Bar Association (the “ABA”) 
recommendation that has not been sufficiently explored by scholars. 
However, the ABA recommendation is merely a best practices suggestion, 
whereas this Article advocates a mandatory education program. In 2002, 
 
 167. Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 46 (noting that in public companies, meaningful shareholder 
involvement is difficult due to collective action problems: disperse “[s]hareholders have neither the 
information nor the incentives to make sound decisions on either operational or policy questions”). 
However, institutional shareholders such as unions and public employee pension funds find say-on-pay 
appealing, and their interests often vary from average shareholders. Id. at 47.  
 168. Fairfax, supra note 118, at 1715. 
 169. Id. at 1718. 
 170. The Author has practiced law as an executive compensation lawyer for most of the past 
decade, and formerly worked as a Certified Public Accountant. 
 171. I.R.C. § 409A (2012). 
 172. Standard Instructions for Filing Forms Under Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975—Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2012) 
[hereinafter Regulation S-K]. 
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the Enron bankruptcy prompted the ABA to appoint a Task Force on 
Corporate Responsibility to examine systemic corporate governance 
issues.173 The Task Force’s Preliminary Report suggested certain reforms 
that should be imposed on public companies on a mandatory basis, and 
other principles that boards should adopt as a matter of best practices of 
corporate governance.174 One of the best practices that the task force 
advocated was that public companies should: 
Institute and maintain a training and education program for all 
directors, and particularly independent directors, in regard to (a) their 
legal and ethical responsibilities as directors, (b) the financial 
condition, the principal operating risks and the performance factors 
materially important to the business of the corporation and (c) the 
operation, significance and effects of compensation incentive programs 
and related party transactions.175 
b. Comparative Law Considerations 
In addition to being consistent with the ABA’s recommendation for 
U.S. public companies, the proposed continuing education 
recommendation is consistent with international corporate governance 
trends. In recent years, several European countries have adopted 
requirements or recommendations that their remuneration committees 
(the term often used in Europe for compensation committees) have 
compensation knowledge or experience. In 2009, the European 
Commission issued a recommendation on remuneration policy that 
included a proposal (the “EC Recommendation”) that “[a]t least one of 
the members of the remuneration committee should have knowledge of 
and experience in the field of remuneration policy.”176 Although 
European Commission Recommendations are not binding on Member 
States of the European Union, some Member States have decided to 
follow the EC Recommendation.177 Six (twenty-two percent) of the 
twenty-seven Member States have endorsed the EC Recommendation, 
twenty (seventy-four percent) have not endorsed it (or did so to a lesser 
extent than originally proposed), and one (four percent) did not provide 
data.178 The six Member States that endorsed the EC Recommendation 
 
 173. James H. Cheek, III et al., Preliminary Report Of The American Bar Association Task Force 
On Corporate Responsibility, 54 Mercer L. Rev. 789, 790 (2003). 
 174. Id. at 805. 
 175. Id. (emphasis added). 
 176. Commission Recommendation (EC) No. 385/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 120) 28, 31. 
 177. Report on the Application by Member States of the EU of the Commission 2009/385/EC 
Recommendation (2009 Recommendation on Directors’ Remuneration) complementing 
Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as Regards the Regime for the Remuneration of 
Directors of Listed Companies, at 6, COM (2010) 285 final (May 2, 2010). 
 178. Report on the Application by Member States of the EU of the Commission 2009/385/EC 
Recommendation (2009 Recommendation on Directors’ Remuneration) Complementing 
Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as Regards the Regime for the Remuneration of 
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include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Lithuania, Portugal and Slovenia.179 
One of those six countries (Belgium) adopted it as a mandatory 
legislative provision—which is commonly referred to in the European 
Union as “hard law”—whereas the other five countries adopted a 
“comply or explain” approach—which is commonly referred to as “soft 
law.”180 Belgium enacted the law by amending its Belgian Companies 
Code to implement several corporate governance changes, including a 
requirement that listed companies have a remuneration committee that 
(1) is composed of a majority of independent directors and (2) has the 
necessary expertise in the area of remuneration policy.181 
Even though twenty Member States did not adopt the EC 
Recommendation, seven of them took alternative approaches that are 
within the spirit of the EC Recommendation, such as recommending that 
all board members have sufficient qualifications to fulfill their respective 
duties.182 And in Germany, the German Share Institute (Deutsches 
Aktieninstitut, DAI) started a movement in 2010 “for better and 
continuous education of board members.”183 
In considering the EC Recommendation, some Member States noted 
that a compensation expertise standard like the one adopted by Belgium 
would be too difficult to define.184 Indeed, Belgium does not appear to 
define expertise in its new law.185 However, the recommendation in this 
 
Directors of Listed Companies, at 15–16, SEC (2010) 670 (June 2, 2010) [hereinafter Report on 
Remuneration], available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/directors-remun/sec-
2010-670-2_en.pdf. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. “Comply or explain” is a “soft law” approach in which companies must either comply or 
explain why they chose not to comply. All E.U. jurisdictions have a corporate governance code stating 
that listed companies are not required to follow, but they must annually report whether they comply and 
explain the reason for any noncompliance. See Kraakman et al., supra note 142, at 67–69. 
 181. Elke Janssens et al., New Belgian Corporate Governance Act on Remuneration in Listed 
Companies, NautaDutilh (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.newsletter-nautadutilh.com/xzine/ 
xzine.html?xzine_id=4468&cid=4&aid=12053. 
 182. Report on Remuneration, supra note 178, at 15–16. For example, (1) Spain, Finland, the 
Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia generally recommended that each board member have sufficient 
expertise, experience, and/or qualifications to perform to fulfill her duties, (2) Italy recommended that 
at least one member of the Remuneration Committee have expertise in finance, and (3) Luxembourg 
recommended that the Remuneration Committee have access to the necessary skills and means to 
fulfill the role (which could include compensation consultants). Id. 
 183. Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International 
Regulation, 59 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 27 n.145 (2011). For good governance, a “tailored induction program 
should be established for all members, and the particular capabilities of individual directors relevant to 
their service on the board should be disclosed,” keeping in mind that with independence comes a lack 
of firm specific-knowledge. Id. at 27. 
 184. Report on Remuneration, supra note 178, at 6. 
 185. Wet tot versterking van het deugdelijk bestuur bij de genoteerde vennootschappen en de 
autonome overheidsbedrijven en tot wijziging van de regeling inzake het beroepsverbod in de bank- 
en financiële sector [Law Concerning Corporate Governance] of Apr. 6, 2010, Belgisch Staatsblad 
[B.S.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Apr. 23, 2010, available at http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/mopdf/ 
2010/04/23_1.pdf. 
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Article does not rise to the level of proposing that any compensation 
committee members of U.S. public companies become “compensation 
experts” per se. Rather, the proposal herein is akin to the financial 
literacy requirement imposed on all audit committee members, as 
opposed to the higher standard of financial expertise required for at least 
one audit committee member. 
Clearly, there is some level of support globally to follow the education 
requirements advocated in this Article. The United States could build on 
this momentum to adopt a similar standard, either as “hard law,” as in 
Belgium, or “soft law,” as in Austria, Denmark, Lithuania, Portugal, and 
Slovenia. Hard law would be preferable because soft law is generally 
believed to be less effective for corporate governance purposes. For 
example, some companies in the European Union claim to comply with 
soft law, but in reality do not follow the spirit of the soft law, or they 
simply do not report whether or not they have complied.186 However, if it 
proves politically unfeasible to enact these recommendations as hard law 
in the United States, then soft law would be an appropriate compromise. 
Ultimately, a global norm will probably emerge for continuing education 
on compensation committees. 
c. Comparison to Audit Context 
In the audit context, financial literacy is determined by each 
company’s board in its business judgment,187 whereas financial expertise 
is generally based on experience in certain well-defined positions, such as 
serving as a public accountant, controller, or Chief Financial Officer.188 In 
the compensation context, on the other hand, there are no such well-
defined positions, so requiring compensation committee members to 
become “experts” might be problematic. 
However, if accreditation bodies in the compensation field were to 
devise an appropriate certification in the United States, then this might 
be an appropriate reform in the future. For example, WorldatWork 
Society of Certified Professionals sponsors a Certified Executive 
 
 186. Kraakman et al., supra note 142, at 67–69. 
 187. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, § 303A.07 (“Each member of the audit committee must be 
financially literate, as such qualification is interpreted by the listed company’s board in its business 
judgment, or must become financially literate within a reasonable period of time after his or her 
appointment to the audit committee. In addition, at least one member of the audit committee must 
have accounting or related financial management expertise, as the listed company’s board interprets 
such qualification in its business judgment. While the Exchange does not require that a listed 
company’s audit committee include a person who satisfies the definition of audit committee financial 
expert set out in Item 407(d)(5)(ii) of Regulation S-K, a board may presume that such a person has 
accounting or related financial management expertise.” (emphasis added)). 
 188. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(5)(ii) (2012). Public companies must disclose that the 
company’s board has determined that the audit committee has at least one financial expert, or explain 
why it does not have one. Id. 
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Compensation Professional designation and notes that certification 
signals that one is an expert in the field, and is intended for professionals 
involved in various aspects of executive compensation strategy or 
administration, including finance, legal, and tax.189 Certification involves 
taking an examination and completing twelve recertification credits every 
three years.190 If regulators decide to implement a requirement for 
compensation committee expertise, then other certification programs 
could be developed that are tailored more directly to the needs of board 
members. 
2. Rotations 
In addition to being subject to mandatory continuing education 
requirements, the compensation committee should have a rotation 
system. However, due to practical concerns caused by differences in the 
number of independent directors on various boards, this proposal should 
be a recommended rather than mandatory measure. 
a. How Rotations Address Organizational Behavior Issues 
Imposing a rotation program would address some of the group 
dynamic concerns discussed in Subpart II.C. In particular, studies show 
that reciprocity is more likely to occur when groups continue to interact 
over time, and when groups are small and homogeneous.191 In the United 
States, compensation committees are usually comprised of an average of 
only three directors, and the entire board typically averages eleven 
members in total.192 In addition, the composition of boards tends to lack 
diversity of gender, race, or other background.193 This lack of diversity is 
exacerbated when only a subset of the board is involved. 
Directors are not currently required by law to rotate or be subject to 
term limits or mandatory retirement, so they could remain on the board 
and the compensation committee indefinitely, assuming that they are 
reelected. Ironically, when rotation off the compensation committee has 
occurred in the past, it might have been for perverse reasons. It has been 
suggested that members of the compensation committee “who won’t play 
 
 189. Certified Executive Compensation Professional, WorldatWork Soc’y of Certified Profs., 
http://www.worldatworksociety.org/society/certification/html/certification-cecp.jsp (last visited Feb. 4, 
2014). 
 190. Frequently Asked Questions About Certification, WorldatWork Soc’y of Certified Profs., 
http://www.worldatworksociety.org/society/certification/html/certification-faq.jsp (last visited Feb. 4, 
2014). 
 191. O’Reilly & Main, supra note 65, at 685. 
 192. Kraakman et al., supra note 142, at 70; see Fairfax, supra note 118, at 1713–14 (“The average 
public company board consists of ten directors, a number that has been virtually unchanged for at least 
a decade.”) 
 193. See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 110, at 800–04; see also Julia Werdigier, Fund Plans to Invest in 
Companies with Women as Directors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 2009, at B7. 
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along [with CEO compensation requests] are rotated out to other 
committees.”194 
For the reasons described above, compensation committees fit the 
profile of groups that are prone to reciprocity: they are small and 
homogenous, and they continue to interact over time.195 These factors 
also contribute to groupthink.196 Although the size of the committee need 
not change, this Article proposes the adoption of a rotation system to 
provide a mechanism for “shaking up” static group dynamics, infusing 
new perspectives, and minimizing reciprocity and groupthink. 
There is admittedly a significant risk that directors who rotate onto 
the compensation committee of a particular company will have already 
been captured by management of that company if they come from 
another position on that company’s board, as opposed to from a different 
company’s board, which is an alternative proposal discussed below. 
However, there is still some benefit to having a different set of eyes 
reviewing and approving the executives’ compensation packages because 
each person will assess the packages from her own personal viewpoint and 
raise unique questions and concerns. This will alleviate the groupthink 
issue discussed in Subpart II.C.2. 
Further, as Hwang and Kim’s study made clear,197 the extent to 
which an individual director is likely to approve high amounts of 
compensation varies based on the extent of her social ties to the CEO. If 
a board has directors with varying levels of social ties to the CEO, a 
rotation system will help to distribute the directors such that those with 
extensive social ties are not always on the compensation committee. 
In addition, if the chair of the compensation committee rotates, it 
will alleviate the social cascades factor whereby people follow a leader’s 
action because they lack information to form their own opinion. Rather 
than consistently following the idiosyncratic views of a particular person 
who always serves as the compensation committee chair, the compensation 
committee will have the opportunity to be led by different individuals. 
 
 194. John G. Steinkamp, A Case for Federal Transfer Taxation, 55 Ark. L. Rev. 1, 22–23 (2002) 
(quoting Sarah Anderson et al., Executive Excess 2001, United for a Fair Economy 1, 4 (2001) 
(describing a Fortune magazine study)) (“The process by which corporate boards generally determine 
CEO compensation may be largely responsible for the tremendous increases in recent years: ‘In this 
market the same person—the executive—sits on both sides of the bargaining table. The nominal 
buyer, the corporation, usually makes its purchase through the compensation committee of the board 
of directors, which traditionally consists of independent (non-management) directors. The 
compensation committee, in turn, relies on compensation information generated by the corporation 
itself or by an outside consultant retained by the corporation. In reality, however, the internal 
information, and even the conclusions of the consultant are under control of the chief executive.’ It has 
been suggested that ‘directors who won’t play along are rotated out to other committees.’ Directors 
who do ‘play along’ with CEO compensation requests may breach their duties to shareholders.”). 
 195. See supra Subpart II.C.2. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
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b. Logistical Issues 
Setting practical concerns aside, the best approach for the rotation 
program would be to impose a term limit for how long a director could 
serve on the compensation committee. After a set period of time, she 
would rotate to another board committee. If the limited number of 
independent directors on a particular board makes this impossible, the 
next best approach would be to impose a term limit for the compensation 
committee chair. After a set period of time, she would step down as chair 
and remain on the committee but allow another committee member to 
assume the chairperson role. 
This dual approach is ideal because of the structural limitations of 
boards; although public companies are required to have a majority of 
independent directors,198 boards vary in the extent to which the number of 
independent directors exceeds this baseline requirement. The percentage 
of independent board members has increased in the past decade.199 In 
2012, eighty-four percent of directors on Standard & Poor’s 500 boards 
were independent, and the CEO was the only non-independent director 
on fifty-nine percent of Standard & Poor’s 500 boards.200 Given these high 
percentages of independent directors, the preferred rotation system (in 
which directors can only serve on the compensation committee for a fixed 
number of years before rotating off it) seems feasible for most public 
companies. 
However, companies that have only a slight majority of independent 
directors would have difficulty implementing a mandatory rotation 
program for the members of the compensation committee, especially 
because (1) the compensation committee, nominating/corporate 
governance committee,201 and audit committee must each have only 
independent directors, and (2) audit committee members must also be 
financially literate and have one financial expert, such that companies 
will need their audit committee members to stay on that committee if 
those directors are the only ones who satisfy those requirements. As 
such, if a company has only a slight majority of independent directors, 
 
 198. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, § 303A.01 cmts (“Effective boards of directors exercise 
independent judgment in carrying out their responsibilities. Requiring a majority of independent 
directors will increase the quality of board oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging conflicts of 
interest.”). 
 199. Spencer Stuart, 10 Years Later: Sarbanes-Oxley Act Continues to Shape Board 
Governance (July 30, 2012) (summarizing data compiled as part of a 2012 Spencer Stuart U.S. Board 
Index). The percentage has increased from seventy-nine percent in 2002 to eighty-four percent in 2012 
for Standard & Poor’s 500 boards. Id. 
 200. Id. See Beecher-Monas, supra note 85, at 118 (“Over the last decade, boards have been 
getting smaller and more independent. Most boards in large corporations now consist primarily of 
independent directors, that is, directors without direct financial or family ties to the corporation.”). 
 201. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, § 303A.04(a).  
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there might not be enough independent directors on the board to rotate 
onto the compensation committee on a regular basis. 
But even just having the compensation committee chair rotate could 
be helpful. This is because the compensation chair position is considered 
by some experts to be the most difficult role to serve on the entire board 
of directors because of the inherent tensions and difficulties involved in 
saying “no” to the CEO.202 
A rotation period of five years would be appropriate to balance the 
need to bring in fresh perspectives with the need to retain institutional 
knowledge and chemistry within the committee.203 As explained above, 
imposing a maximum length of time for service as a member or 
chairperson of the compensation committee would help to alleviate the 
social forces that can lead compensation committees to approve high levels 
of executive pay.204 At the end of a five-year term of service, the 
compensation committee member or chairperson (depending on the 
approach adopted by the company) would step down from the role. After 
a five-year break, during which the chair could serve on another 
committee, she would be permitted to rejoin the compensation committee. 
c. Other Support for Rotations 
After Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted in 2002, there were a few calls to 
impose rotations on not only audit firm partners (as discussed below), 
but also on compensation committee members.205 However, those 
recommendations for compensation committee rotations were never 
implemented. It is not clear why this was the case; the literature does not 
reflect an extensive or recent discussion of this point. This Article’s 
rotation recommendation for compensation committees, though supported 
by these earlier recommendations, is more developed and nuanced. It is 
framed by scholarly literature and appropriate for the current financial 
environment. 
Although compensation committee rotations did not end up being 
added to Sarbanes-Oxley, the time is finally ripe for this reform. The 
reform is more appropriate and timely now because the financial crisis that 
led to Dodd-Frank was largely related to compensation issues,206 whereas 
the financial crisis that led to Sarbanes-Oxley (such as the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals) was primarily related to accounting issues.207 
Furthermore, a compensation committee rotation program would 
help to spread the workload among compensation committee members, 
 
 202. James F. Reda et al., Compensation Committee Handbook at xi (2d ed. 2001). 
 203. See Wood, supra note 133, at 13–14. 
 204. See supra Subpart II.C. 
 205. See, e.g., Kittrell & McElligott, supra note 153, at 9. 
 206. See supra Subpart I.A. 
 207. Beecher-Monas, supra note 85, at 129. 
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because they would serve only for a fixed term. Compensation committee 
members were already meeting more frequently prior to Dodd-Frank 
and will probably meet even more frequently now, given that Dodd-
Frank focuses on the compensation committee and places the committee 
under increased scrutiny.208 This can result in a significant workload for a 
small number of people, as the compensation committee typically only 
has three members.209 
As mentioned above, in 2003 the ABA Task Force provided several 
recommendations to address systemic corporate governance issues in the 
wake of the Enron bankruptcy. One of the best practices recommended 
in the Task Force’s Preliminary Report was for boards to “[c]onsider 
whether to establish term limits or policies governing rotation of the 
chair and membership of the Board of Directors and its Corporate 
Governance, Audit and Compensation Committees, and the number of 
board and committee memberships.”210 
In addition, some executive compensation practitioners endorsed 
periodic rotation of compensation committees shortly after Congress 
enacted Sarbanes-Oxley.211 In 2004, for example, an executive 
compensation practitioner advocated for a periodic review of committee 
assignments.212 He noted that although rotation would infuse the 
committee with fresh perspectives, it would cause the committee to lose 
members with knowledge of the company’s compensation practices.213 In 
2005, two other practitioners noted that “[t]rue independence for a 
compensation committee may extend beyond the requirements of the 
stock exchange rules. . . . Periodic rotation of membership can bring new 
perspectives.”214 
Nonetheless, a recent survey of public companies found that “[a]s 
the workload and challenges facing board committees increase, member 
rotation policies remain infrequent.”215 For example, some boards do not 
favor mandatory rotation of committee assignments or chairpersons as a 
general matter because the board believes that experience and continuity 
are more important than rotation; however, they acknowledge that 
rotation should occur if it is likely to increase committee performance.216 
Further, although rotation is not currently required for any board 
 
 208. Fairfax, supra note 118, at 1714. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Cheek, III et al., supra note 173, at 805. 
 211. See, e.g., Kittrell & McElligott, supra note 153, at 9. 
 212. Wood, supra note 133, at 13–14. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Kittrell & McElligott, supra note 153, at 9. 
 215. Tonello, supra note 158. 
 216. E.g., Corporate Governance Principles, ADP, http://www.adp.com/about-us/corporate-social-
responsibility/governance/corporate-governance-principles.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2014). 
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committees, many companies rotate their lead or presiding independent 
director.217 
d. Comparative Law Considerations 
From a comparative law standpoint, it appears that no other 
countries mandate a rotation of board committee members. However, 
there are important corporate governance differences that make rotation 
less necessary outside the United States. Several countries have a two-
tier board structure, either on a mandatory basis (e.g., Germany, China, 
and the Netherlands), or on an optional basis (e.g., France and Italy).218 
Also, companies in all E.U. jurisdictions can now opt for a corporate 
form called the Societas Europaea, which allows either a one-tier board 
or a two-tier board.219 The two-tier structure includes (1) a supervisory 
board that is entirely composed of independent directors (and, in some 
countries, employee and union representatives) and (2) a management 
board that is entirely composed of executives.220 
Because the remuneration committee in such countries is a sub-
group of the supervisory board, and no executives sit on the supervisory 
board, they are more insulated from management influence.221 In the 
United States, on the other hand, the majority of the board must be 
independent, but the CEO and sometimes other officers typically serve 
on the board, or at least join board meetings on an informal basis.222 As 
such, concerns about managerial influence are stronger on U.S. boards. 
In addition, although the United States has not adopted regulations 
linking director independence and board tenure, many countries outside 
the United States have.223 
 
 217. Julie Hembrock Daum & David Kimbell, Achieving Greater Independence in the Board 
Room, Point of View, 2005, at 25, 31, available at http://content.spencerstuart.com/sswebsite/ 
pdf/lib/POV_Issue_1_2005.pdf (“While the NACD Blue Ribbon Council recommends not rotating the 
role of the lead and presiding director, we found rotation to be a common practice, particularly among 
boards with a presiding director. More than half of the surveyed companies with presiding directors 
rotate the role versus just one-third of companies with lead directors.”). 
 218. Kraakman et al., supra note 142, at 57 n.6 (“For France see Art. L. 225-57 Code de 
commerce. For Italy see Art. 2409-8 to 2409-15 Civil Code. For the SE, see Art. 38 Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 Oct. 2001, 2001 O.J. (L 294) 1.”). 
 219. Id. at 56–57. 
 220. Id. 
 221. However, “the extent of the distinction between the board structures is often unclear. 
Informal leadership coalitions can cross-cut the legal separation between management and supervisory 
boards [e.g., in German companies with no controlling shareholder, the management board often picks 
the supervisory board]; while supermajorities of independent directors and an independent chairman 
can give single-tier boards a quasi-supervisory flavor. . . . [L]abor codetermination in Germany, the 
most prominent two-tier jurisdiction, weakens the supervisory board as a governance organ devoted 
exclusively to the interests of the shareholder class.” Id. at 57–58. 
 222. See Stuart, supra note 199; see also discussion supra Subpart II.C.2. 
 223. Romanchek and Keckley, supra note 96 (noting that “In Hong Kong and Singapore, a 
company must disclose reasons why it believes a director should still be considered independent after 
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e. Diversity 
If companies adopt a rotation system in the United States, then they 
should keep diversity of backgrounds in mind. For a mandatory rotation 
system to be as effective as possible, it will be important for the board to 
consider having a diverse pool of candidates from varied backgrounds 
when any new directors are selected to join the board, rather than using a 
limited pool of candidates based on personal connections. If replacement 
directors are in the same social circle as, or are friends with, the CEO, the 
ability of the director to avoid groupthink will, of course, be diminished.224 
In addition to diversity of personal and professional backgrounds, 
there is extensive literature regarding the importance of gender and 
racial diversity in board membership.225 Moreover, recent SEC rules 
require disclosure of the role of diversity in selecting board members, 
and the SEC has voiced concerns about lack of diversity on boards and 
lack of compliance in companies’ reporting of board diversity.226 The 
SEC requires disclosure of whether, and if so how, a nominating 
committee (or the board) considers diversity in identifying nominees for 
directors.227 The SEC did not define diversity, but recognized that some 
companies include only gender, race, and national origin as diversity 
considerations, whereas other companies have a more expansive view of 
diversity that includes different viewpoints, professional backgrounds, 
education, skill, and other individual qualities.228 
A recent survey of public companies reveals that “[a]ccording to the 
director nomination policy of large companies, diversity matters as much 
as business skills. Yet, aside from some level of female representation, 
corporate boards remain remarkably uniform.”229 In the case of smaller 
public companies, this could be because “[m]ost smaller companies save 
board search firm fees and use personal connections to recruit new 
director nominees.”230 
 
serving more than nine years on the board. Similar rules requiring companies to provide ‘sufficient and 
clear’ justification are in place for directors serving more than nine years on boards in Ireland, Italy, 
and the United Kingdom. And in most of Europe, regulations have been passed that automatically 
deem a director to not be independent after serving more than 12 years on the board”). 
 224. See Dorff, supra note 97, at 2078 (noting that constructing diverse groups may combat 
groupthink, but that the empirical data on this is mixed). 
 225. See supra Subpart II.C.2. See generally Mijntje Lückerath-Rovers, A Comparison of Gender 
Diversity in the Corporate Governance Codes of France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom (Apr. 6, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, the Netherlands), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1585280. 
 226. Comm’r Luis A. Aguilar, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Keynote Speech by SEC Commissioner: An 
Update on Diversity and Financial Literacy (Apr. 30, 2011) (transcript available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch043011laa.htm). 
 227. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 239, 240, 249, 274 (2009). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Tonello, supra note 158. 
 230. Id. 
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Some might ask why diversity is not enough to solve the problems 
identified in this Article. Why should boards have to implement 
education and rotation requirements when they can simply have more 
women and minorities on the board in order to reduce homogeneity and 
the risk of groupthink? One response is that if the diverse candidates 
share the same educational and professional backgrounds and the same 
social ties as the CEO, they too are still susceptible to managerial 
influence. Increased diversity is helpful, but not sufficient, in responding 
to the problem. 
Beyond encouraging diversity, it is not practical to legislate that 
members can have no prior relationships with a CEO, for the reasons 
discussed above, including the difficulty measuring personal relationships. 
However, it is advisable for the nature and extent of any such relationships 
to be considered when appointing nominally independent directors, 
especially if they will serve on the compensation committee.231 
f. Comparison to Audit Context 
Although listing standards do not currently require rotation of 
directors or committee members, Congress has embraced rotations as a 
mechanism to preserve independence in other contexts. Rotation 
requirements apply to the independent auditors that report to the audit 
committee. Specifically, section 203 of Sarbanes-Oxley made it “unlawful 
for a registered public accounting firm to provide audit services to an 
issuer if the lead (or coordinating) audit partner (having primary 
responsibility for the audit), or the audit partner responsible for 
reviewing the audit, has performed audit services for that issuer in each 
of the 5 previous fiscal years of that issuer.”232 This rule, enacted after the 
Enron bankruptcy, was intended to improve the independence of 
independent auditors. 
In addition, the NYSE Listed Company Manual indicates that the 
audit committee should not only ensure the regular rotation of the lead 
audit partner as required by law, but also “should further consider 
whether, in order to assure continuing auditor independence, there 
should be regular rotation of the audit firm itself.”233 Further to that 
suggestion, regulatory agencies in the United States and the European 
Union recently considered expanding the mandatory rotation 
requirement to require the audit firm itself—rather than just the audit 
partners—to rotate.234 After extensive consideration by scholars and 
 
 231. See Wood, supra note 133, at 10. 
 232. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(j) (2013). 
 233. N.Y. Stock Exch., supra note 44, § 303A.07(b)(iii)(A) (emphasis added). 
 234. See, e.g., Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., PCAOB Release No. 2011-006, Concept 
Release on Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation 2 (2011). “The PCAOB is a nonprofit 
corporation established by Congress [in connection with Sarbanes-Oxley] to oversee the audits of 
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practitioners of the pros and cons of that proposal, it was not adopted. 
Indeed, from a global perspective, rotation of the lead audit partner “is 
now rather common, while external rotation (of the firm) is highly 
controversial and rarely mandated.”235 Yet, this recent debate shows that 
the concept of rotations is still a hot topic in the corporate governance 
field. Moreover, some of the arguments for and against the proposal are 
relevant to the question of whether compensation committee members 
should rotate. 
Various experts weighed in on the audit firm rotation proposal. For 
example, a joint team of accounting/finance professors and practitioners 
determined that although “[e]nhancing perceived and actual auditor 
independence is a worthy objective for public policy. . . . [M]andating 
audit firm rotation would be a bad policy. Indeed, such a change may 
impair auditor independence, weaken audit expertise and undermine 
corporate governance.”236 
However, some of the concerns that led to rejection of audit firm 
rotations are not present in the compensation committee rotation context. 
Most significantly, experts noted that “a policy of mandatory auditor 
rotation could undermine accretion of expertise and impair audit quality” 
because auditors are most vulnerable to missing fraud in new 
engagements, and accounting quality increases with auditor tenure.237 Such 
concerns do not exist in the compensation committee context, though, 
because the role of the compensation committee is to design and approve 
executive compensation rather than to detect fraud and perform audits. 
Furthermore, experts were also concerned that auditor independence 
would be undermined because audit firms would engage in “beauty 
contests” every few years to solicit new business, which would lead to 
bidding wars, solicitous relationship building, and opinion shopping.238 
Again, that concern does not apply to directors who are merely switching 
roles on the board. This concern would be more troubling and apropos if 
one were to propose rotation of the compensation consultants that advise 
compensation committees. 
 
public companies in order to protect investors and the public interest by promoting informative, 
accurate, and independent audit reports.” About the PCAOB, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
http://pcaobus.org/About/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).  
 235. Hopt, supra note 183, at 63 n.361 (noting that in Austria, rotation of the audit firm “was 
introduced by law, but then abolished before the law came into force”). 
 236. See, e.g., Tracey C. Ball et al., Audit Firm Rotation: A Joint Academic and Practitioner 
Perspective 1 (Jan. 3, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.som.yale.edu/ 
shyamsunder/Research/Accounting%20and%20Control/Presentations%20and%20Working%20Pape
rs/AuditFirmRotation/Audit_Firm_Rotation_%20Dec30_Jamal.pdf (summarizing the findings of a 
joint team of accounting/finance practitioners and professors). 
 237. Id. at 2 (citing various studies). 
 238. Id. 
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In addition, a recent academic study found that the concentration of 
the audit market in only four large international firms would make it 
difficult for mandatory audit firm rotation to bring about the desired 
“fresh look.”239 Admittedly, similar concerns exist for rotation of existing 
board members, if all of the directors have already become subject to 
managerial influence. However, once again, this concern would be more 
pertinent if compensation consultants were required to rotate, because 
the compensation consulting industry, like the audit industry, is 
dominated by a few major players.240 
g. Counterarguments and Alternative Proposals 
In evaluating the proposals in this Article, critics might argue that 
there is not much evidence that rotations and expertise actually help 
boards be more effective. For example, in the auditing context, the 
expertise and rotation requirements have been in place since 2002, yet 
corporations have continued to engage in accounting fraud—the 2010 
Lehman scandal is a prominent example. Of course, it is possible (but 
difficult to prove) that such accounting fraud might have reached an even 
higher level if these reforms had not been in place. Ultimately, it is 
difficult to prove empirically that rotations and expertise are effective 
because once the requirements are put in place there is no control group 
against which to compare companies that implemented the requirements. 
Critics might also argue that this recommended approach is too 
indirect in achieving its goal of augmenting compensation committee 
independence because it does not directly change the definition of 
independence; they might question the “fit” between the problem and 
the proposed reform. Certainly, a reform in which directors are prohibited 
from having social ties to the CEO would eliminate the issue. However, as 
discussed above, it is not practical to change the definition of 
independence in a way that directly addresses the issue of personal 
relationships. 
Another approach with a more direct fit to the problem would be 
for boards to have so-called “professional independent directors” who 
serve set terms of perhaps five to seven years on several corporate 
 
 239. Id. (“Most large clients already receive one service or another from every one of the four 
firms. If one of these accounting firms audits the client, the other three often provide it a host of 
advisory services in tax, valuations etc. This perpetual engagement and pre-existing relationships 
between most large companies and all four major audit firms implies that there is only limited 
opportunity for mandatory rotation to bring about a ‘fresh look.’”). 
 240. See, e.g., Robin Ferracone, When Familiarity Breeds Complacency: Factors to Consider When 
Selecting a Compensation Consultant, Forbes (Feb. 9, 2011, 1:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
robinferracone/2011/02/09/when-familiarity-breeds-complacency-factors-to-consider-when-selecting-a-
compensation-consultant (noting that three of the top five compensation consulting firms are 
integrated firms that offer a variety of services, primarily to management). 
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boards, and then rotate to different companies’ boards.241 Some scholars 
advocate that approach.242 One advantage of that approach is that 
because the directors who rotate onto a company’s board will come from 
another company’s board, it decreases the concern that such directors 
have been captured by management of the new company on whose 
board they serve. However, this approach is generally viewed as a radical 
and controversial type of corporate director rotation that has gained little 
support.243 The recommendations in this Article are a creative yet 
practical approach to indirectly achieve the goal of enhancing the 
independent judgment of the compensation committee members. These 
recommendations are less radical, and thus more likely to be adopted, 
than the professional independent director approach. 
In addition, critics might argue that the two recommendations in this 
Article work against each other because after equipping themselves with 
compensation-related knowledge, the compensation committee members 
would eventually be required to rotate off the compensation committee. 
However, the committee member will have a five-year period during 
which to use the knowledge she learns. Using a five-year period decreases 
concerns that would arise if the rotation cycle were more frequent. 
Moreover, the rotations could occur on a staggered basis, such that all 
directors would not rotate off the committee at the same time. This 
seems like a reasonable compromise because the benefits of periodic and 
staggered rotation after an extended period of time would outweigh any 
loss of expertise. 
As an alternative, if the rotation proposal recommended in this 
Article is not implemented, compensation committees should consider 
adopting the best practice of having alternating members of the committee 
raise critical questions during board deliberations in a “designated 
naysayer” capacity.244 For example, the United Kingdom, in its corporate 
governance code, encourages non-executive directors to “constructively 
 
 241. See, e.g., William S. Lerach, Plundering America: How American Investors Got Taken for 
Trillions by Corporate Insiders: The Rise of the New Corporate Kleptocracy, 8 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 
69, 107–08 (2002). Such directors would need to meet certain qualification requirements, and “could 
apply to sit on specific boards but would be assigned by the SEC.” Id. at 107. They “would be required 
to report any suspected legal violation to corporate counsel and—absent satisfactory action—to the 
SEC.” Id. This arguably would improve corporate governance because “[a]fter all, who would deal 
drugs if the ‘narc’ was sitting in the room?” Id. at 108. 
 242. See, e.g., Vikramaditya Khanna & Timothy L. Dickinson, The Corporate Monitor: The New 
Corporate Czar?, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1713, 1741 (2007). 
 243. See, e.g., Robert C. Pozen, The Case for Professional Corporate Boards, Brookings (Dec. 5, 
2010), http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/12/05-professional-boards-pozen (proposing a 
professional independent board model but acknowledging that even if various concerns are satisfied, 
“it will take extraordinary efforts to persuade a company to adopt the new board model”).  
 244. See Dorff, supra note 97, at 2075 (noting that having half of a group play Devil’s Advocate 
can be helpful for introducing conflict). 
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challenge” strategy proposals and scrutinize management’s performance.245 
This can help stimulate discussion of alternative viewpoints and reduce 
the risk of groupthink. In several corporate failures, the failure of the 
board to ask critical questions or to consider alternative viewpoints 
helped lead to corporate failure.246 Although the designated naysayer 
approach might not be as effective as having an entirely different person 
join the compensation committee or assume the committee chair, it 
would be somewhat helpful in achieving the spirit of a rotation system. 
Conclusion 
The compensation committee independence requirement in Dodd-
Frank is not sufficient to achieve its goal of making compensation 
committee members independent of management because it does not take 
into account relevant insights from organizational behavior literature 
regarding group dynamics. Those insights indicate that nominally 
independent directors might still be subject to psychological pressures 
that lead them to approve excessive amounts of compensation for the 
management of the company on whose board they serve. Due to the 
difficulties of incorporating personal relationships into the independence 
standards, this Article proposes an alternative approach for lessening the 
extent to which independent directors might become subject to managerial 
influence. This approach includes two reforms for compensation 
committees: (1) mandatory continuing professional education and (2) an 
optional rotation system. Regulators and/or companies should consider 
implementing these proposals to augment the reforms instituted under 
Dodd-Frank. 
Although say-on-pay has already resulted in several cases in which 
the majority of shareholders of U.S. public companies cast negative votes 
on compensation, such votes are of limited effect due to their advisory 
and ex post nature—they are non-binding votes on compensation 
decisions that have already been approved by compensation committees. 
Making structural changes to the compensation committee, as advocated 
in this Article, is an ex ante approach that can supplement the ex post 
say-on-pay vote. 
The recommendations endorsed in this Article are likely to make 
the reforms that have already been enacted more effective. While the 
reforms in Dodd-Frank are appropriate and well-intended, they do not 
go far enough to address one of the underlying causes of inappropriate 
executive compensation decisions: social dynamics coupled with long 
tenure and a lack of compensation expertise within the compensation 
 
 245. Fin. Reporting Council, The UK Corporate Governance Code § A.4 (2012). 
 246. Davidoff, supra note 90. 
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committee. Those factors make it difficult for compensation committee 
members to say “no” to CEOs. 
By empowering shareholders to say “no,” say-on-pay has begun to 
empower compensation committees to say “no” too because the committee 
members want to avoid negative say-on-pay votes and the associated 
negative ramifications. In a similar manner, rotations and continuing 
education are additional tools that can empower compensation committee 
members to be more effective directors. Although these tools might at 
first appear to be burdens on compensation committee members, they 
can ultimately be helpful tools that empower compensation committee 
members and enable them to fulfill their duties on the board. Ultimately, 
the recommendations in this Article, along with the other reforms that 
have already been implemented under Dodd-Frank, might help to prevent 
future financial crises. 
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